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The Existing Indian Family Exception: 
Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act* 
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly 
reduced if our children, the only real means for the 
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in 
non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of 
their People. 1 
!. INTRODUCTION 
American Indian tribes have faced the threat of cultural extinction 
since the first European explorer set foot on American soil. During 
colonial times this threat was found in the colonists' attempts to 
Christianize American Indians so they could be assimilated into the 
European culture.2 When assimilation failed, the threat was the removal 
of American Indians from their ancestral homelands and their subsequent 
placement on reservations during the nineteenth century.3 By the end 
of the nineteenth century, tribal culture was threatened by the individual 
• The author would like to thank Professor Jean Montoya for her insight and 
encouragement 
I. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) (statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians regarding the crisis tribes faced due to separation 
of Indian children from their families and tribes). 
2. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTI.E, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 6 (I 983). 
3. Id. at 6-7. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 forced southern tribes to relocate 
in the west. The impact of this removal was devastating. 16,000 thousand Cherokees 
were marched west on the "Trail ofTears." The Choctaw nation was forced to surrender 
ten million acres of ancestral homeland. Tribal members who remained on ancestral 
homelands lost their tribal citizenship and were forced to assimilate into the European 
culture. Id. 
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allotment of reservation land.4 In the mid-twentieth century, a short-
lived policy of tribal termination not only threatened, but almost 
destroyed, tribal culture.5 
The termination policy was effectively ended by the emergence of a 
new policy of tribal self-determination.6 However, the threat to tribal 
culture did not end. The threat this time was the wholesale removal of 
American Indian children from their tribal culture. Studies conducted in 
1969 and 1974 showed that twenty-five to thirty percent of American 
Indian children were separated from their families and tribes by 
placement in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.7 Once 
removed from their families, most of the children were placed in non-
Indian environments.8 In comparison to Caucasian children, the 
disparity in removal statistics is staggering. In one state the risk that a 
Indian child would be removed from her family was 1600 percent 
greater than that of a Caucasian child.9 Removal statistics of other 
states are similarly disproportionate. 
Due to the mass removal of Indian children, tribal leaders faced a 
precarious dilemma. Why were Indian children removed from their 
families and communities in such overwhelming numbers? How could 
the tribes prevent the wholesale removal of children from their homes? 
Tribal leaders feared that if they lost their next generation of tribal 
members, their cultural traditions would inevitably die.10 How could 
4. Id. at 9. The General Allotment Act of 1887 authorized the President to allot 
reservations to individual tribal members. Id. Through the allotment policy, the federal 
government had hoped to tum the American Indians into farmers. However, nearly half 
of the allotted land was unsuitable for farming and much of the suitable farm land was 
quickly leased or sold to Anglo-American settlers once Congress' amended the Act to 
allow such action. Id. at 10. By 1928, assimilation through individual ownership was 
considered a failure, and Congress attempted to reverse its effects by adopting the Indian 
Reorganization Act in 1934. Id. at 12-14. 
5. Id. at 20. 
6. Id. at 22. 
7. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7531. The compiled statistics were based on studies conducted in 16 states. In some 
states the risk of removal was even higher. In Minnesota one out of every eight 
American Indian children lived in adoptive placement Id. 
8. Id. Approximately 85% of the American Indian children removed from their 
families were placed in non-native homes. 
9. Id. This overwhelming figure came from the state of Wisconsin. The removal 
statistics of other states were just as overwhelming. In South Dakota, where Indians 
made up 7% of the juvenile population, 40% of all adoptions were of Indian children. 
In Washington state, the adoption rate in comparison to Caucasian children was 19 times 
greater and the foster care placement rate was 10 times greater. Id. 
10. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the United 
States Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 154 (1977). At the 
hearing, a Choctaw tribal chief testified that without the tribal children "education, the 
tribe, Indian culture have little meaning or value for the future." Id. 
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tribal culture continue to exist when the tribal children were being raised 
in non-Indian environments? Worse yet, what would happen to these 
children, raised in a culture which stereotyped Indians as uncivilized 
creatures who needed to be assimilated into mainstream Euro-American 
culture?11 
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 ("ICWA") attempted to answer 
these questions and solve the tribes' and families' dilemma.12 Why 
were Indian children removed from their homes in such overwhelming 
numbers? The ICWNs legislative history indicates that judges and 
social workers were ignorant of the American Indian extended family 
dynamic.13 Congress designed the ICWA provisions to combat this 
ignorance by providing minimum standards for the removal of Indian 
children from their homes.14 Congress also sought to place removal 
decisions with those who had the greatest understanding of Indian 
culture and the most to lose, the tribes.15 To reach this end, the ICWA 
grants the child's tribe either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in 
Indian child custody matters. In cases where the state court retains 
jurisdiction, provisions designed to protect the interests of parent, child, 
and tribe must be followed. 16 
Has the ICWA been successful in curtailing the removal of Indian 
children and protecting tribal and family integrity? Not always. Since 
the ICWA's inception state courts have struggled with its application and 
11. For a thorough discussion of American Indian assimilation see Linda J. Lacey, 
The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. 
L. REV. 327, 349 (1986). 
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1923 (1994). ICWA became fully effective and applied to 
new and subsequent proceedings initiated 180 days after November 8, 1978. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1923 (1994). 
13. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7532. The extended family often consisted of grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, or 
the entire tribe. See Lacey, supra note 11, at 331-32. Social workers were unfamiliar 
with this extended family dynamic, and they often equated leaving a child with an 
extended family member as neglect Social workers also viewed with disfavor the 
permissive child-rearing methods used by Indians. Interestingly, few Indian children 
were removed from their families because of physical abuse. Most removals were based 
on vague standards such as neglect or social deprivation. Alcoholism was another 
frequently (and unequally) cited basis for removal. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 9, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7532. 
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994) (congressional declaration of policy). 
15. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a), (b) (1994). 
16. See discussion infra Part 11.B-D. 
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in difficult cases often refuse to apply it.17 This Comment will address 
one theory used to avoid application of the ICWA, the "existing Indian 
family exception."18 The exception's basic premise is that the ICWA 
only applies when an Indian child is removed from an existing Indian 
family unit. To support this basic premise, courts applying the exception 
conclude that Congress' prevailing purpose in enacting the ICWA was 
to prevent the removal of Indian children from Indian families. 19 
Therefore, they conclude, the purpose of the ICWA is not served when 
it is applied outside the boundaries of an "existing Indian family." The 
question then becomes: What is an "Indian family''? 
Courts applying the existing Indian family exception focus on either 
(1) the bond between the Indian parent and child, or (2) the parents' or 
child's ties to the reservation or tribal culture. The exception was first 
applied in cases involving unwed Indian fathers' attempts to intervene 
in adoption proceedings where the biological mother was non-Indian.20 
Courts have also applied the exception in cases where an Indian mother 
attempts to revoke a voluntary relinquishment of custody.21 Finally, the 
exception is increasingly applied in cases where the court detennines the 
Indian parent is detached from tribal culture or the reservation.22 
17. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare Act 
and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991), 
I 8. States following the existing Indian family exception include Alabama, 
Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and Washington. 
See S.A. v. E.J.P ., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Appeal in Maricopa 
County, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct App. 1983); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 
1982); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 
(La. Ct App. 1995), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995), and cert. denied, I 16 S. 
Ct 1549 (1996); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct App. 1986); In re Adoption of 
Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Adoption of Infant Boy 
Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992). States rejecting the exception include Alaska, 
Idaho, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit 10, § 40.1 (West Supp. 1997); In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 
1989); I11 re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 
(Mich. 1996); In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. 1992); In re Adoption of 
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); In re D.A.C., No. 950573-CA, 1997 LEXIS 17 
(Ut App. Feb. 27, 1997). California appellate courts have split on application of the 
exception. See In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 53 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1996) 
(supporting the exception); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 
(1996) (supporting the exception), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct. 693 
(1997); Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1991); In 
re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3d 655, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1990); In re Junious M., 144 
Cal. App. 3d 786, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1983). 
19. See In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
20. See id.; In re Adoption of Baby Boy D. 
21. See In re Adoption ofT.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988). 
22. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Adoption of 
Infant Boy Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (1992). Petitioners have also unsuccessfully attempted 
to apply the exception in intra-family disputes and surrogacy disputes. This Comment 
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This Comment analyzes the soundness of the existing Indian family 
exception. Part II summarizes the basic provisions of the ICWA 
focusing on the definitions, jurisdiction, intervention, and minimum 
standards provisions. Part ill analyzes the basic premise of the existing 
Indian family exception and its evolving application. Part IV critiques 
the exception's basic premise and the application of the exception. Part 
V concludes that the existing Indian family exception is a judicially 
created exception to the ICWA which subverts the tribal and family 
rights the ICWA was designed to protect. 
II. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
The Indian Child Welfare Act applies in child custody proceedings 
involving Indian children. Tribal jurisdiction in these proceedings is 
either exclusive or concurrent. When a state court retains jurisdiction in 
a concurrent jurisdiction case, the ICWA provides minimum federal 
standards to guide the state court proceedings.23 
A. The Jurisdictional Provisions 
The most significant of the ICWA provisions are the jurisdictional 
provisions. The ICWA provides that tribes will have either exclusive or 
concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. A "child 
custody proceeding" is defined as one involving foster care placement, 
termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive 
placement. Proceedings involving custody determinations in divorce 
proceedings and juvenile delinquency proceedings are specifically 
exempted from the definition.24 "Indian" is defined as any member of 
will not address this failed application, but for a discussion of the issues see Toni H. 
Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act 69 N.D. 
L. REV. 465 (1993). , 
23. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
DESKBOOK 363-64 (Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF 
WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL]. 
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994). Section 1903(1) provides in full: · 
'[C]hild custody proceeding' shall mean and include--
(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an 
Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement 
in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator 
where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child returned 
upon demand, but where parental rights have not been terminated; 
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an Indian tribe or an Alaskan native who is a member of a Regional 
Corporation.25 An "Indian child" is one who is a member of an Indian 
tribe or the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe and eligible 
for membership in an Indian tribe. The child must be under eighteen 
years of age and unmarried.26 The "Indian tribe" is any tribe, band, 
nation, or organized group eligible for services provided to Indians by 
the Secretary of the Interior.27 
Whether a tribe will have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is based 
on the location or domicile of the Indian child. When the Indian child 
resides or is domiciled on the reservation, the ICWA grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the tribal court. Once an Indian child is adjudicated a 
ward of the tribal court, jurisdiction remains with the tribe regardless of 
where the child is subsequently domiciled or residing.28 
Concurrent jurisdiction arises when the Indian child is domiciled off 
the reservation. In this situation, a state court child custody proceeding 
must be transferred to the tribal court upon petition by either parent, the 
tribe, or an Indian custodian.29 However, the state court retains 
Id. 
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action resulting 
in the termination of the parent-child relationship; 
(iii) "pre-adoptive placement'' which shall mean the temporary placement 
of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of 
parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement; and 
(iv) "adoptive placement'' which shall mean the permanent placement of 
an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree 
of adoption. 
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act 
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an 
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents. 
25. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(3) (1994). 
26. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(4) (1994). 
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1994). Section 1903(8) provides: 
"Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group 
or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to 
Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any 
Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of Title 43 .... 
Id. Section 1903(11) defines "Secretazy'' as the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(11) (1994). 
28. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(a) (1994). Section 191 l(a) provides: 
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child 
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled 
within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise 
vested in the state by existing federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward 
of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwith-
standing the residence or domicile of the child. 
Id. 
29. The term "parent'' includes any biological parent or any adoptive parent. The 
term does not include an unwed father unless paternity has been acknowledged or 
established. U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1994). An "Indian custodian" is an Indian person who 
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jurisdiction if: (1) it determines there is good cause to retain jurisdic-
tion; (2) either parent objects to the transfer; or (3) the tribal court 
declines jurisdiction.Jo 
The appropriateness of the state courts' retaining jurisdiction based on 
a finding of good cause is the subject of considerable debate.JI 
Although the ICWA does not define "good cause," the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs has promulgated advisory guidelines as to what constitutes "good 
cause."32 Under the guidelines, good cause to retain jurisdiction of an 
Indian child custody proceeding may exist where: (1) the proceeding is 
in an advanced stage; (2) the Indian child is over twelve years of age; 
(3) the presentation of evidence at the tribal court would create an undue 
hardship to the parties or witnesses; or (4) the Indian child is over five 
years of age, has had minimal or no contacts with the tribe, and the 
child's parents are unavailable.33 These guidelines, however, are the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs' interpretation of the ICWA and are not binding 
upon any court.34 In addition to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' 
enumerated guidelines, many state courts retain jurisdiction for "good 
cause" when they determine that it is in the best interest of the child.JS 
Therefore, a state court may readily retain jurisdiction over an Indian 
child who does not reside on the reservation. However, the state court 
must still follow the ICWA?s substantive and procedural provisions. 
has custody of an Indian child. This custody may be legal custody granted by a tribal 
or state court or mere care, custody, and control transferred by the child's parent. 25 
u.s.c. § 1903(6) (1994). 
Id. 
30. 25 U.S.C. § 191l(b) (1994). Section 191l(b} provides: 
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination 
of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the 
reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in·the absence of good cause 
to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, 
absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the 
Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall 
be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe. 
31. A thorough analysis of the debate over the "good cause" provisions of the 
ICWA is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full analysis of this issue see Jeanne 
L. Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REv. 585 (1994). 
32. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State 
Courts, Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67591 (1979). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Dale, supra note 17, at 353. 
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B. Tribal Intervention 
In addition to providing exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction to tribes 
in Indian child custody proceedings, the ICWA allows tribes liberal 
intervention into state court proceedings. An Indian child's tribe or the 
child's Indian custodian may intervene in a state court foster care 
placement or termination of parental rights proceeding at any time.36 
Additionally, state courts must give full faith and credit to tribal courts. 
The full faith and credit extends to all public acts, records, and 
proceedings of an Indian child custody proceeding.37 
C. Minimum Guidelines 
In addition to the jurisdictional and intervention provisions, the ICWA 
provides minimum guidelines for state courts to follow when they retain 
jurisdiction of an Indian child custody matter. These standards establish 
procedural and substantive safeguards for the protection of the child, 
parents, and tribe. The core provisions provide procedure and establish 
the burden of proof for pending state court proceedings;38 provide 
protection of parental rights in voluntary termination proceedings;39 
offer preferences for the placement of Indian children;40 and allow 
invalidation of state court action if certain ICWA provisions are 
violated.41 
I. Procedural and Proof Requirements 
Several procedural provisions protect the rights and interests of the 
tribe, the child, and the parent. In child custody cases pending in state 
courts where the court knows or has reason to know that the child is an 
Indian child, the ICWA requires a party seeking foster care placement 
or termination of parental rights to notify the child's parent or Indian 
custodian and the child's Indian tribe. This notification is only required 
in involuntary foster care placement or parental rights termination 
proceedings.42 Currently, no notice is required in voluntary foster care 
36. 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(c) (1994). 
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994). 
38. 25 u.s.c. § 1912 (1994). 
39. 25 u.s.c. § 1913 (1994). 
40. 25 u.s.c. § 1915 (1994). 
41. 25 u.s.c. § 1914 (1994). 
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994). Section 1912(a) provides in pertinent part: 
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reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster 
(VOL.34: 381, 1997] Indian Family Exception 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
proceedings or voluntary adoption cases.43 The ICWA further protects 
the parent or Indian custodian by mandating appointment of counsel.44 
Additionally, active efforts must be made to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family through remedial services and rehabilitation programs.45 
In addition to the procedural requirements, the ICWA prescribes the 
burden of proof for foster care placement and parental rights termination 
proceedings. In foster care placement proceedings, the court must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Indian child is likely to 
suffer serious emotional or physical damage if the child remains in the 
custody of the parent or Indian custodian.46 In order to terminate 
parental rights, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Indian child is likely to suffer serious emotional or physical damage if 
Id. 
care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall 
notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered 
mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their 
right of intervention. . . . 
43. Recently proposed legislation seeks to amend the ICW A by requiring notice 




44. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1994). Section 1912(b) provides in full: 
In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent or Indian 
custodian shall have the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal, 
placement, or termination proceeding. The court may, in its discretion, 
appoint counsel for the child upon a finding that such appointment is in the 
best interest of the child. Where State law makes no provision for appoint-
ment of counsel in such proceedings, the court shall promptly notify the 
Secretary upon appointment of counsel, and the Secretary, upon certification 
of the presiding judge, shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of funds 
which may be appropriated pursuant to section 13 of this title. 
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1994). Section 1912(d) provides in full: 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that 
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these 
efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1994). Section 1912(e) provides in full: 
No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence 
of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including 
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child 
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child. 
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the child remains in the custody of the parent or Indian custodian.47 
Further, placement of the child or termination of parental rights must be 
supported by qualified expert testimony.48 
2. Voluntary Placement or Termination 
The ICWA provides several safeguards to ensure the protection of 
parental rights where the parent or Indian custodian voluntarily place a 
child in foster care or terminates parental rights. Consent to the 
placement or termination must be in writing and recorded with the court. 
The court must certify that the parent or Indian custodian understood the 
termination or placement. Additionally, voluntary consent given less 
than ten days after the birth of the child is invalid.49 
The ICWA also protects the parent or Indian custodian by allowing 
liberal withdrawal of consent. In the case of foster care placement, 
consent may be withdrawn at any time, and the child will be returned to 
the parent or Indian custodian.so Where voluntary termination of 
parental rights or adoption is at issue, the parent may withdraw consent 
at any time before the entry of the final order, and the child ,viii be 
returned to the parent.s1 Additionally, a court will vacate a final 
adoption decree if consent to the adoption was ·gained by fraud or 
duress.s2 
Id. 
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1994). Section 1912(e) provides in full: 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the 
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody 
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child. 
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e), (t) (1994). 
49. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1994). 
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (1994). Section 1913(b) provides in full: "Any parent 
or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement under State law at 
any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian 
custodian." Id. 
Id. 
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1994). Section 1913(c) provides in full: 
In any voluntarY proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or adoptive 
placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for 
any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or 
adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent. 
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1994). 
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3. Placement Preferences 
Tribal concerns regarding the placement of Indian children are 
safeguarded by placement preference provisions. In adoptive placement 
proceedings, preference is given first to the extended family, then to 
other tribal members, and finally to other Indian families.53 Similarly, 
preference standards apply in foster care placement proceedings. First 
is placement with the extended family, second is placement in a tribally 
specified foster care home, third is placement in a non-Indian authorized 
Indian foster home, and finally placement in a tribally approved 
institution.54 The ICWA mandates that the social and cultural standards 
of the tribe should influence these adoptive and foster care placement 
preferences.55 
4. Invalidation 
The final and possibly most stringent safeguard allows a parent, an 
Indian custodian, or the child's tribe to petition the state court to 
invalidate foster care placement or termination actions when certain 
provisions of the ICWA have been violated.56 The petitioning party 
must show a violation of jurisdictional provisions, procedural provisions, 
burden of proof provisions, or voluntary placement provisions.57 
D. Proposed Amendments 
The ICWA has remained unchanged since its inception in 1978. 
There have, however, been several bills introduced in Congress which 
proposed substantial amendments to the act. Currently, legislation that 
would both benefit and burden tribes is pending in the House of 
Id. 
53. 25 U.S.C. § !915(a) (1994). 
54. 25 u.s.c. § 1915(b) (1994). 
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994). Section 1915(d) provides in full: 
The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this 
section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian 
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the 
parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties. 
56. 25 u.s.c. § 1914 (1994). 
57. Id. 
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Representatives.58 This current bill is substantially similar to legislation 
that passed the Senate, but was stalled by the House of Representatives 
during the final days of the 104th Congress.59 The pending bill is 
considered a compromise to proposed legislation that would have 
codified the existing Indian family exception.60 · 
The 104th Congress is not the first to consider the existing Indian 
fanµly exception. Ironically, Senate Bill 1976, which would have 
overruled the existing Indian family exception, was introduced in the 
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs during the 100th Congress.61 
Most notably, Senate Bill 1976 sought to amend the ICWA's definition 
of "Indian child" and "child custody proceeding" to guarantee that it 
applied to Indian children who did not live on the tribe's reservation, 
"regardless of whether that child was a member of an existing Indian 
family."62 One catalyst behind Senate Bill 1976 was the delay often 
accompanying cases involving the ICWA.63 The bill sought to limit 
delays by clarifying the ambiguities in the act and strengthening tribal 
rights under the act.64 
Several years passed before new amendments to the ICWA were 
proposed. On May 6, 1995, Representative Pryce of Ohio introduced 
House Bill 1448 which would have limited the ICWA by assuring that 
58. H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997). 
59. See S. 1962, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996). 
60. See H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996). 
61. S. 1976, 100th Cong. (1987). 
62. S. 1976 §§ 4(1), (5)(c). Section 4(1) provides: "'child custody proceeding' 
shall mean and include any proceeding referred to in this subsection involving an Indian 
child regardless of whether the child bas previously lived in Indian Country, in an Indian 
cultural environment or with an Indian parent ...• " S. 1976 § 4(1). Section (5)(c) 
includes as an "Indian child" a child who "is of Indian descent and is considered by an 
Indian tribe to be part of its community •••• " S. 1976 § 4(5)(c). Additionally, the bill, 
among other things, added definitions for domicile, qualified expert witness, and 
residence; limited the state courts' ability to deny transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court 
for good cause; extended tribal notice provisions to adoptive and pre-adoptive placement; 
strengthened the states' evidentiary burden; further protected the Indian child's right to 
maintain ties to tribal culture; required tribal notice for voluntary placement proceedings; 
established an Indian child welfare committee; and extended the ICWA's coverage to 
Canadian aboriginal people. S. 1976 §§ 4(2), 4(11), 4(13), IOl(b), 102(a), 102(g), 
102(h), 103(2), I 14, 116. 
63. 133 CONG. REC. 36601 (1987) (statement of Sen. Evans). In speaking of the 
Indian child in Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) Senator Evans stated: 
It is extremely unfortunate that this young Indian boy and his family were 
subjected to such a long and trying court battle. This unreasonable delay 
stems from conflicting views over interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act. Lack of clarity in the act resulted in many court disputes over jurisdic-
tion and agency responsibility. Furthennore, ambiguities inherent in the 
language of the act have helped to sustain these problems. 
Id. , 
64. 133 CONG. REC. 36607-08 (1987). 
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tribal membership decisions were prospective and could not be used to 
retroactively invoke the ICWA.65 Under House Bill 1448, the ICWA 
would only apply if the Indian child or Indian parent was a tribal 
member at the initiation of child custody proceedings.66 The bill 
defined tribal membership as enrollment or recognition as a member 
"under consistently applied policies and practices .... "67 House Bill 
1448 was referred to the Subcommittee on Native American and Insular 
Affairs, and the Subcommittee held hearings on the bill on May 10, 
1995.68 Testimony from the hearings revealed that Indian adoptions 
under the ICWA were often prolonged and caused instability in the 
Indian child's placement.69 Adoption advocates testified that House 
Bill 1448 would limit the instability and prolonged litigation.70 Tribal 
representatives testified that prolonged litigation could be avoided if the 
65. H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995). See also S. 764, 104th Cong. (1995) (a 
virtually identical bill introduced in the Senate on May 8, 1995, by Senator Glen). 
66. H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill provided: "For the purposes of any 
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child, membership in an Indian tribe shall 
be effective from the actual date of admission to membership in the Indian tribe and 
shall not be given retroactive effect" H.R. 1448 § 2(e). The bill was prompted in part 
by a California custody battle that was finally settled by the California Court of Appeal 
in In re Bridget R, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996); 141 Cong. Rec. 
H6023-02 (1995) (statement of Rep. Pryce). Speaking of the trial court's ruling in 
Bridget R., Representative Pryce stated: 
Yesterday, a judge in California took [adoptive children] away from the only 
family they have ever known and awarded custody to a perfect stranger, the 
birth grandmother. 
The only reason for this is that the girls are 1/32 Pomo Indian and the judge 
ruled that the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to these children and that tribal 
rights supersede all other interest 
Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation to amend the ICWA to prevent 
these injustices in the future. 
141 CONG. REC. H6023 (daily ed. June 15, 1995). The trial court's ruling in Bridget R. 
was overturned on appeal when the appellate court applied the existing Indian family 
exception to avoid the ICW A. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text 
67. H.R. 1448 § l(b)(13). Toe bill provides: "'Member ofan Indian tribe' means 
a person who is on the membership roll (or otherwise considered a member under 
consistently applied policies and practices) of the Indian tribe •... " Id. 
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 11 (1996). 
69. Id. The report provides: "The hearings ... demonstrated that avoidable and 
prolonged litigation over the application of ICW A needlessly destabilizes some Native 
American adoptions. This litigious environment discourages adoptive parents from 
adopting Native American children, and disrupts some adoptive placements to the 
detriment of the child." Id. 
70. Id. at 2-3. 
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ICWA's tribal notice provisions included voluntary adoption proceed-
ings.71 Based on the sharply divided testimony, the Committee 
instructed tribal representatives and adoption advocates to work together 
in reaching a solution to the problems raised at the hearings.72 
Before a compromise could be reached, new ICWA amendments were 
introduced in the House of Representatives.73 These amendments, 
which were eventually incorporated as part of the Adoption Promotion 
and Stability Act of 1996, resurrected House Bill 1448 and also sought 
to codify the existing Indian family exception.74 The bill limited child 
custody proceedings, in cases where the family did not live on the 
reservation, to families who maintained "significant social, cultural, or 
political affiliation with the Indian tribe of which either parent is a 
member."75 After narrowly passing the House, the ICWA amendments 
were struck by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.76 Significant-
ly, neither tribal representatives nor the House Committee with 
jurisdiction over Indian affairs was consulted in drafting the amend-
ments. 77 
Compromise finally came when Senator McCain introduced Senate 
Bill 1962 on July 16, 1996.78 Senate Bill 1962 was the result of 
negotiations between tribal representatives and adoption advocates.79 
The National Congress of American Indians, at its 1996 mid-year 
convention, developed compromise amendments that served as the basis 
for Senate Bill 1962.80 These amendments, in turn, where supported 
71. Id. at 2. The report also provided that delay is often caused in cases requiring 
notice to the tribes because the notice is either late or never comes at all. Studies in 
Alaska revealed that "social workers notified tribes in only 47.3 percent of cases 
reviewed, [and provided notice] ... in only 77.8 percent of cases prior to termination 
of parental rights." Id. 
72. Id. at 3. 
73. H.R. 3286, 104th Cong. (1996). 
74. H.R. 3286 §§ 301, 302. The amendments to codify the existing Indian family 
exception were originally proposed by H.R. 3275, 104th Cong. (1996). The House 
Committee on Resources rejected the amendments, but they were reincorporated while 
the bill was in the Rules Committee. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 14 (1996). 
75. H.R. 3286 § 301. 
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 3, 14 (1996). 
77. Id. at 14. 
78. 142 CONG. REC. S7900 (daily ed. July 16, 1996). 
79. 104 S. REP. No. 104-335, at 11-12 (1996). Senate Bill 1962, 104th Cong.§ 6 
{1996) was the product of the year-long efforts of several representatives of the adoption 
community and of Indian tribal governments who jointly developed compromise 
amendments to the ICW A. Id. The Senate Report indicates that the National Congress 
of American Indians, the National Indian Child Welfare Association, the American 
Academy of Adoption Attorneys, and the Academy of California Adoption Attorneys 
were actively involved in developing the compromise legislation. Id. at 12. 
80. Id. 
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by adoption advocates.81 Identical legislation was introduced in the 
House on July 16, 1996.82 The compromise amendments contained in 
the Senate and House bills provided notice to tribes in voluntary child 
custody proceedings;83 limited when a tribe could intervene in volun-
tary proceedings;84 created criminal sanctions for attorneys who 
concealed a child's Indian heritage;85 and limited the biological parents' 
81. Id. at 24 ("Representatives of both the Indian tribes and the adoption 
community have confirmed that S. 1962 is within the parameters of, and is consistent 
with, the 'Tulsa' compromise agreement.") See also Statement of Deborah J. Doxtator, 
May 26, I 996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional 
Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in 
CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829257 (Wisconsin Oneida Tribal Chairwomen 
generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Mary Thomas, May 26, 1996, 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal 
Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996 
WL I 0829256 (Gila River Indian Community Governor generally supporting Senate Bill 
1962); Statement ofW. Ron Allen, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 
26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829255 (National Congress of 
American Indian President generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Michael 
J. Walleri, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of 
Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, 
available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829723 (Tanana Chiefs Conference 
general counsel generally supporting Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Marc Gradstein, 
May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional 
Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in 
CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829207 (adoption attorney generally supporting 
Senate Bill 1962); Statement of Jane A. Gorman, May 26, 1996, Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, Transcript of Congressional Testimony, Federal Documents Clearing 
House, Inc., May 26, 1996, available in CONGTMY database, 1996 WL 10829208 
( adoption attorney on behalf of American Academy of Adoption Attorneys and the 
Academy of California Adoption Lawyers generally supporting Senate Bill 1962). 
82. H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996). 
83. S. 1962, 104th Cong. § 6 (1996). The amendment provided: "A party that 
seeks the voluntary placement of an Indian child or the voluntary termination of the 
parental rights of a parent of an Indian child shall provide written notice of the 
placement or proceeding to the Indian child's tribe." Id. Under the bill, tribal notice 
would be required within I 00 days of foster care placement, within five days of 
preadoptive or adoptive placement, and within 10 days of commencement ofan adoption 
proceeding. Id. 
84. S. I 962 § 8. This section limited the time in which a tribe could intervene 
in a voluntary proceeding. In cases terminating parental rights, the tribe received 30 
days from receipt of notice to intervene or object. In voluntary adoption cases, the tribe 
received 90 days from receipt of notice of an adoptive placement and 30 days from 
receipt of notice of adoption proceedings. Id. 
85. S. 1962 § 9. This section required criminal sanctions be imposed on anyone, 
other than a birth parent, who "knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up 
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withdrawal of adoption consent.86 The amendments did not address the 
existing Indian family exception. 
Senate Bill 1962 passed the Senate on September 26, 1996.87 
However, the House bill was stalled in the final days of the 104th 
Congress by the National Right to Life Committee's lobbying efforts.88 
The committee feared the bill would encourage abortions among Indian 
families because women would lose control over their pregnancies.89 
Substantially similar legislation was introduced in the 105th Congress on 
March 18, 1997, and is currently pending in the House of Representa-
tives.90 Again, the newly proposed amendments do not address the 
existing Indian family exception-an ironic twist considering the 
exception sparked the ongoing legislative debate. 
by trick, scheme, or device, a material fact concerning whether •.. a child is an Indian 
child ... or a parent is an Indian .... " Id. The sanctions were included in the 
amendments in the hope that fear of criminal liability would prevent adoption attorneys 
and advocates from concealing a child's Indian heritage. Earlier testimony indicated 
that birth parents were often encouraged to hide their Indian heritage to avoid application 
of the ICWA. S. REP. No. 104-335, at20-21 (1996). 
86. S. 1962 § 5. Revocation of voluntary adoptive consent is limited under this 
section to 180 days from the date the tribe receives notice. If the birth parent does not 
receive notice of the adoption proceedings 30 days before the conclusion of the 180 day 
period, the revocation period is extended 30 days from the date of actual notice to the 
parent Id. 
87. 142 CONG. REC. DI007 (daily ed. Sept 26, 1996). 
88. Failed Indian Adoption Law Spurs Hard Feelings, Az. DAILY STAR. Dec. 12, 
1996, available in 1996 WL 15090686. 
89. Id. See also Roger K. Lowe, Indian Adoption Bill Dies in House Pryce Says 
She'll Push for More Reform, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct I, 1996, available in 1996 WL 
11023740 (indicating that Rep. Pryce will push new legislation in the 105th Congress). 
Abortion opponents apparently assumed that some Indian 'mothers would rather abort 
their babies than see them raised within their tribal culture. 
90. H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997). House Bill 1082 was introduced by 
Representatives Young and Miller. In his remarks accompanying the bill, Representative 
Miller indicated that the parties did not wholeheartedly support the compromise 
agreement. 
This bill is intended to strengthen the [ICW A], to protect the lives and future 
of Indian children first and foremost .... We understand that to a few parties 
on either side of the debate this bill may not seem perfect Few compromises 
are. But what this bill does is truly important This bill helps Indian children 
by providing allowing [sic] adoption to move forward quickly and with greater 
certainty. This bill places limitation on when Indian tribes and families may 
intervene in the adoption process. Yet at the same time, this bill protects the 
fundamental rights of tribal sovereignty. 
143 CONG. REc. E462 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Miller). 
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ill. THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION 
A. Basic Premise 
As previously noted, the ICWA is applicable in child custody 
proceedings involving Indian children. Thus, there are only two 
requirements for invocation of the ICWA. First, the proceeding must be 
a child custody proceeding as defined by the ICWA. Second, the child 
must be an Indian child as defined by the ICWA.91 Contrary to the 
plain language of the ICWA, some courts have created a third require-
ment for invocation of the ICWA, an existing Indian family. These 
courts reason that the ICWA should only apply when an Indian child is 
being removed from an Indian home. Congress' purpose in enacting the 
ICWA, they conclude, was to maintain existing Indian families and to 
provide minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children 
from Indian homes. 
The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception originated 
in adoption proceedings involving illegitimate children of non-Indian 
mothers and putative Indian fathers. In the earliest of the notable cases, 
In Re Adoption of Baby Boy L,92 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a 
trial court's refusal to apply the ICWA in the adoption of an enrolled 
member of the Kiowa tribe.93 
Baby Boy L. was the illegitimate son of Miss L., a non-Indian, and 
Carmon Perciado, a five-eighths-blood quantum Kiowa tribal member. 
Upon the birth of the child, Miss L. consented to Baby Boy L.'s 
adoption. Perciado, who received notice of the adoption proceedings 
while incarcerated, objected to the adoptive parents' attempts to 
terminate his parental rights and sought permanent custody of his son.94 
During the trial to terminate Perciado's parental rights, the court learned 
of Perciado's ethnicity and continued the trial to allow proper notice to 
the Kiowa tribe. Following notice, the Kiowa tribe petitioned to 
91. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 23, at 364-67. 
92. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
93. The refusal to apply the !CW A was based, in part, on the fact that the child 
was not being removed from an existing Indian family. Id. at 176. 
94. Id. at 172-73. Neither Miss L. nor the adoptive parents disputed that Perciado 
was the natural father of Baby Boy L. 
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intervene in the proceedings, change temporary custody,95 and transfer 
jurisdiction to the tribal court.96 The trial court found that the ICWA 
did not apply to the proceedings and denied the Kiowa tribe's peti-
tions.97 
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings and held 
that "the ICWA, by its own terms, does not apply to [the] proceedings 
••• • "
98 The court reasoned that to apply the ICWA to the factual 
situation would violate Congress' policy and intent in adopting the 
ICWA.99 Congress' overriding concern in enacting the ICWA, the 
court opined, was to maintain existing Indian family homes and tribal 
relationships and provide minimum standards for the removal of Indian 
children from these existing homes.100 Thus, the existing Indian 
family exception was bom. 
B. Application 
In analyzing the existing Indian family exception, the first question 
must be what constitutes an Indian family. The courts applying the 
exception have considered two factors to determine whether a child is a 
member of an existing Indian family. The first factor focuses on the 
family aspect of the exception. Here, to constitute an Indian family, the 
Indian child must have developed a bond with an Indian parent. The 
second factor focuses on the "Indian-ness" of the family. To constitute 
an Indian family under this factor, the Indian parent or child must have 
significant ties to tribal culture or the reservation.101 
95. The court previously granted temporary custody to the adoptive parents. Id, 
at 172. 
96. Additionally, the Kiowa tribe enrolled Baby Boy L. as a tribal member on the 
basis of the child's 5/16 blood quantum. Miss L. opposed the enrollment. Id. at 173. 
91. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 173. 
98. Id. at 176. 
99. Id. at 175. In reaching this opinion, the court relied on and extensively quoted 
a critique of the ICW A by Professor Russell Lawrence Barsh. The court emphasized 
that "[t]he Act principally applies to cases where a state court attempts to remove an 
Indian child from his or her home on grounds of the alleged incompetence or brutality 
of the parents." In re Adoption of Baby Boy L. 643 P.2d at 176 (quoting Russell L. 
Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
1287, 1305 (1980)). 
100. Id. at 175. "A careful study of the legislative history behind the Act and the 
Act itself discloses that the overriding concern of Congress and the proponents of the 
Act was the maintenance of the family and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes 
and to set minimum standards for the removal of Indian children from their existing 
Indian environment" Id. 
101. For a similar analysis see In re Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1490-
92, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 685-86 (1996). 
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I. Existing Bond With Indian Parent 
Cases refusing to apply the ICWA under the first factor (because the 
child does not have a sufficient bond with an Indian parent) can be 
divided into two broad categories. The first, and by far the largest, 
category involves attempts by Indian fathers (or the father's tribe) to 
invoke the ICWA. These cases generally involve a non-Indian unwed 
mother's attempt to place her Indian child for adoption with a non-
Indian family against the wishes of the child's Indian father or tribe. By 
invoking the exception here, state courts ignore the ICWA and apply 
state law. This allows the state court to deny the Indian father or tribe 
the right to intervene and also allows the state court to avoid a 
placement preference with an Indian family. The second category 
involves attempts by Indian mothers (or the mother's tribe) to invoke the 
ICWA. Here, state courts generally apply state law to thwart an Indian 
mother's attempt to revoke a voluntary adoption or foster care place-
ment. Additionally, by refusing to apply the ICWA state courts again 
may ignore placement preferences. 
a. Indian Fathers 
As noted, the category involving Indian fathers is by far the largest 
and oldest of the two categories. In fact, the case that developed the 
existing Indian family exception, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 
involved a non-custodial Indian father. The early courts applying the 
exception primarily stayed within this category. The first court to 
consider the newly developed exception was the Arizona Supreme Court. 
In In re Appeal in Maricopa County,102 the supreme court denied 
application of ICWA because the Indian father had not acknowledged 
paternity of the Indian child.103 The court reasoned that until a 
putative Indian father acknowledges paternity, the child is not an Indian 
102. 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. 1983). In this case the unwed non-Indian mother (R.M.) 
met with Catholic Social Services (C.S.S.) prior to the birth of the child to arrange for 
adoption. R.M. told C.S.S. she did not know who the father was, but suspected it might 
be a Pima Indian, Edmund Jackson. Following the birth of the child (who had Indian 
features), C.S.S. located Jackson and informed him of the child. Jackson visited the 
child, but at the time made no attempt to acknowledge paternity. Id. at 230. 
I 03. Id. at 232. 
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child under the ICWA.104 This rationale was based on the ICWA's 
definition of "parent," which does not include an unwed father who has 
not acknowledged or established paternity. 105 The court concluded that 
its construction of what constitutes an Indian child was in accord with 
the ICWA's congressional intent, namely to prevent the destruction of 
Indian families.106 Although the Arizona court used the same rationale 
as the Kansas court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., it distinguished 
its decision. In Baby Boy L. the Kansas Supreme Court had refused to 
apply the ICWA even though the father acknowledged patemity.107 
The distinguishing factor, according to the Arizona court, was the 
acknowledgment of the child. Thus, Arizona has limited its application 
of the existing Indian family exception. 
Even though the Arizona court did not fully embrace the exception, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on the holding and rationale from 
In re Appeal in Maricopa County to support the existing Indian family 
exception. In In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 108 the court concluded 
that the ICWA did not apply when the child in question had never 
104. Jackson acknowledged paternity of the child three years after she was born and 
3 I months after initiation of the adoption proceedings. Id. The definition of Indian 
child under ICW A reads as follows: "'Indian child' means any unmarried person who 
is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe." 25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (!994). 
I 05. For a discussion of putative fathers' rights under the ICW A see Toni H. Davis, 
The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act 69 N.D. L. REV. 
465 (1993). 
106. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d at 233. The court specifically 
stated: 
We think Congress has, by this language, evidenced its intent not to extend the 
ICWA to a child whose mother is non-Indian and whose father has failed to 
come forward and lay legal claim to the child. This construction of the ICWA 
is in accord with the stated purpose of the Act-to protect Indian children 
from the destruction of Indian family units by child welfare agencies and 
COurtS. 
Id. But cf. In re Appeal in Coconino County, 736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. 1987) ("The fact that 
a child may have been living in a non-Indian home is no reason, standing alone, to 
dispense with the provisions of the Act"). 
107. Id. at 233 n.5. 
JOS. 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985). Baby Boy D. was the illegitimate child ofa non-
Indian mother and a Seminole Indian father. During the mother's pregnancy, the father 
exhibited no interest in the child and did not object to the mother's intention to place the 
child for adoption. However, the father apparently had a change of heart when he 
learned of the child's adoption and filed a petition to vacate the adoption less than two 
months after the child's birth. Id. at 1059-61. A strong dissent by Judge Kauger 
suggests the father's interest in the child was triggered when his mother learned of the 
child's birth and assumed the child was equally her responsibility as a traditional 
extended Indian family care-giver. Id. at 1077. 
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resided in an Indian family and had a non-Indian mother.109 The 
purpose of the ICWA, the court reasoned, was to provide minimum 
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from existing Indian 
families. 
In In re Adoption of D.MJ.,110 the Oklahoma Supreme Court again 
applied the existing Indian family exception. This time the court used 
the exception to deny a divorced non-custodial Indian father the ability 
to invoke the ICWA. D.M.J. was a ten-year old half-Indian child of 
divorced parents. D.M.J.'s mother placed her- for adoption with a non-
Indian couple. D.M.J.'s full-blood Cherokee father objected and the 
tribe moved to intervene. The trial court determined that due to the 
father's failure to support D.M.J., adoption could proceed without his 
consent. 111 
In applying the existing Indian family exception, the court reasoned 
that because the father had not had custody in the six years preceding 
the adoption, the child was not part of an existing Indian family. 112 
The court also theorized that because the ICWA was designed to prevent 
culture-shock to an Indian child who is placed in a non-Indian environ-
ment, the same concern should prevent the placement of D.M.J. in an 
Indian environment.113 
109. Id. at 1064. The court specifically stated: "Here we have a child who has 
never resided in an Indian family, and who has a non-Indian mother. For the foregoing 
reasons we conclude appellant lacks standing to invoke the ICW A in this case." Id. See 
also In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct App. 1986) (following the rationale of Baby 
Boy L.). The Oklahoma Legislature recently rejected this rationale. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10 § 40.1 (\Vest Supp. 1997) ("It shall be the policy of the state to recognize that 
Indian tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless 
of whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent 
or Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated."). 
110. 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985). 
111. Id. at 1387. 
112. Id. at 1389. The court agreed with the adoptive parents' position that "the 
statute has no application when the child is and has been in the custody of a non-Indian 
parent ..•. " Id. See also In re S.C. 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992) ("The ICWA 
was never meant to apply in those cases ... where five and six years had gone by 
without the [Indian] father's being involved."). 
113. Id. Contrary to the court's position, it should be noted that Congress, in 
enacting the ICW A, was concerned with more than just the immediate culture-shock 
suffered by Indian children when placed in non-Indian environments. Congress heard 
testimony regarding the identity crisis older children faced when they realized they were 
different from their adoptive parents and their non-Indian community members. Indian 
Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States Senate, 93rd Cong. 117 (1974) 
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b. Indian Mothers 
Although the majority of cases addressing the existing Indian family 
exception concern the infringement of an Indian father's rights, courts 
have also applied the exception to subvert an Indian mother's attempt to 
invoke the Act. In In re Adoption of T.R.M, 114 the Indiana Supreme 
Court applied the exception in a case where an Indian mother had 
voluntarily given her five-day old child to a non-Indian couple. 115 In 
a one paragraph analysis, the court concluded that the ICWA could not 
apply to a case where the purpose and intent of Congress would not be 
achieved.1'6 The court conceded that the biological ancestry of the 
child was Indian, but stressed that the child had only spent five days in 
an Indian home.117 The court interpreted the purpose of the ICWA as 
protecting "Indian children from improper removal from their existing 
Indian family units . . .. " 118 The application of the exception to 
Indian mothers seems to demonstrate that the parent's gender does not 
effect the application of the exception. The exception instead focuses on 
the bond between parent and child. The irony of this application is that 
the parent and child were never in a position to develop a bond. The 
exception under this analysis imposes an almost impossible requirement 
on the non-custodial Indian parent. 
2. Cultural 'lies 
In the preceding sections, the common factor in the courts' reasoning 
was that the Indian parent and the Indian child had not established a 
significant bond to constitute an existing Indian family. The second 
(statement of Mel Sampson, Northwest Affiliated Tribes, Washington State). 
114. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988). In this case an Indian mother voluntarily placed 
her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian couple. Several months later the mother, 
under the ICWA's revocation provisions, attempted to revoke her voluntary consent. 
The child's tribe joined the mother in her attempts to set aside the adoption, Id. at 302. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 303. In addition to applying the existing Indian family exception, the 
court applied a "best interest of the child" analysis to deny transfer of the matter to tribal 
court under section 191 l(b). Id. at 307-08. For a discussion of the controversial use of 
the "best interest of the child" standard to deny tribal court jurisdiction see Carriere, 
supra note 32. 
111. In re Adoption ofT.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 303. The heart-breaking fact of the 
case was that by the time the court delivered its opinion T.R.M. was seven years old. 
The biological mother of T.R.M. had been fighting for her child for over six years. Id. 
at 301-02. 
118. Id. at 303. But cf In re Termination of Parental Rights of D.S., 577 N.E.2d 
572, 574 (Ind. 1991) (holding that an Indian mother and child constitute a family under 
the ICWA). 
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factor courts consider to determine whether the Indian child is part of an 
existing Indian family is the strength of the Indian parents' ties to tribal 
culture or the reservation. The first case to articulate this requirement 
was S.A. v. E.J.P. 119 Factually, S.A. v. E.J.P. was similar to cases 
involving an unwed non-Indian mother placing an Indian child for 
adoption. What distinguished S.A. v. E.J.P. was that the illegitimate 
child had lived with her Indian father and paternal grandmother for 
approximately one month prior to her placement with the non-Indian 
adoptive couple.120 Here, the court could not rely on the position that 
there was no bond between the parent and child. Instead, the court 
effectively determined that despite the fact that the father was an 
enrolled Cherokee Indian, he could not constitute an "Indian family" 
because he did not live on the reservation and because the child did not 
participate in tribal customs.121 
The requirement of significant tribal or cultural ties has also been 
applied in a case involving an Indian mother. In In re Adoption of 
Crews, 122 the court applied the exception to prevent an Indian mother 
(Crews) from revoking her consent to adoption by a non-Indian couple. 
The facts of this case are sigrrificantly different from all others invoking 
the exception. When Crews arranged for the adoption of her child, she 
was not an enrolled member of any tribe and only suspected that she 
might have Indian ancestry.123 Following the adoption, Crews changed 
her mind and investigated her ancestry in hopes of being able to apply 
119. 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). This case involves a daughter born 
to a seventeen-year old non-Indian mother and a fifteen-year old one-eighth Cherokee 
Indian father (S.A.). After her birth, the baby daughter lived with her mother and 
maternal grandmother. When the daughter was approximately eight-months old she went 
to live with S.A. and his mother (the paternal grandmother). After four weeks, the 
paternal grandmother sought full custody of the baby, but the maternal grandmother 
would not consent. The maternal grandmother instead made arrangements for the child 
to live with a maternal great aunt and uncle. Approximately two years later the maternal 
great aunt and uncle petitioned for adoption, S.A. appealed the adoption on the basis 
that the trial court failed to follow the ICW A. The Cherokee tribe did not intervene in 
the action. Id. at 1187-88. 
120. Id. at 1188. 
121. Id. at I 189-90. The court stated specifically: "The child may be an Indian 
child, as defined by the act, by virtue of her biological father." Id. at 1189. The court 
further stated: "The child has had minimal contact with her father. She has had no 
involvement in tribal activities or any participation in Indian culture. The evidence 
reflects that the father has had only minimal contact with the reservation." Id. 
122. 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992). 
123. Id. at 306-08. 
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ICWA to revoke her voluntary consent to adoption.124 Crews' investi-
gations revealed that she was indeed Indian and that both she and her 
child were eligible for membership with the Choctaw Nation of Oklaho-
ma.125 The Choctaw Nation intervened in the action and joined Crews 
in appealing the adoption. 126 
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the adoption by refusing to 
apply the ICWA. The ICWA was not applicable, the court held, because 
the child had never been part of an existing Indian family. The court 
apparently refused to recognize Crews as an Indian mother.127 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that neither Crews nor the Choctaw Nation 
alleged that the child would grow up in an Indian environment if 
returned to Crews.128 The court did, however, limit the application of 
the exception to the particular facts of the case. 129 
Application of the significant cultural ties requirement is not limited 
to cases where the tribe had no prior contact with the Indian parents or 
child. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rye v. Weasel, 130 recently 
adopted the requirement in a case involving a tribal court ward. The 
child in Rye was an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe.131 Shortly after the child's birth her biological mother voluntari-
ly placed her with Kim and Leilani Weasel.132 The tribal court 
subsequently granted the Weasel's temporary custody and adjudicated 
the child a tribal court ward.133 The child lived with the Weasels for 
approximately ten years and when Kim and Leilani divorced the state 
circuit court awarded custody to Leilani.134 Prior to the award, the 
tribal court unsuccessfully attempted to intervene under ICWA and 
requested transfer of the matter to tribal court. The tribal court also 
ordered that the child be returned to the reservation.135 
124. Id. at 308. The facts specifically state: "Crews testified in a deposition that 
she was unaware of her Choctaw blood until after B. was born and had only researched 
her heritage in order to reinstate her parental rights." Id. 
125. Id. at 307. 
126. Id. at 308. 
127. Crews, 825 P.2d at 310. The court specifically stated: "Neither Crews nor her 
family has ever lived on the Choctaw reservation in Oklahoma and there are no plans 
to relocate the family from Seattle to Oklahoma." Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 311. The court specifically stated: "It is within the narrow circumstanc-
es presented by the specific facts of this case that we find ICWA not applicable." Id. 
130. 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996). 
131. Id. at 259. 
132. Id. Kim Weasel was a Standing Rock Sioux tribal member. Leilani Weasel 
claimed Indian heritage, but was not a member of any Indian tribe. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 259-60.· 
135. Id. at 259. 
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In adopting the existing Indian family exception, the Kentucky court 
focused on the child's and foster family's level of cultural aware-
ness.136 However, awareness alone is apparently not enough to 
constitute an Indian family. The Rye court expected the Indian family 
to "adopt [Indian] culture as a day to day way of life .... "137 The 
court additionally extended the exception to negate a tribe's exclusive 
jurisdiction over tribal court wards.138 The court held that wardship 
should not affect application of the existing Indian family exception 
because it is an exception to the ICWNs jurisdictional provisions.139 
The tribe, the court stated, only "retained nominal legal wardship . 
n140 
The Kentucky court in Rye relied in part on a Louisiana: appellate 
court case, Hampton v. J.A.L. 141 In Hampton, the court held that an 
eleven-sixteenths Sioux mother who had lived on her tribe's reservation 
until age nine, lacked the cultural ties needed to invoke the ICWA.142 
The court stressed that the Sioux mother had lost interest in her tribal 
136. The court noted: "Kayla [the child] is aware of her Indian heritage but has not 
lived in a Tribal Indian home. Traditional Sioux religious practices have not been 
observed in her home, nor have tribal dress or language . . . . She knows some words 
and phrases of the native Sioux language but cannot speak conversationally in it." Id. 
at 260. 
137. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 263. 
138. Id. Section 191 l(a) grants tribes exclusive jurisdiction in Indian Child Welfare 
cases "[w]here an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, ... notwithstanding the 
residence or domicile of the child." 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a) (1994). 
139. Rye, 934 S.W.2d at 263. The court specifically states: "The [existing Indian 
family exception] is an exception to the jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA which 
does not apply to the facts of this case and is not altered by residence, domicile or 
wardship." Id. 
140. Id. The "nominal" wardship was apparently based on the tribes lack of contact 
\vith the child over the years and declining to financially assist the child in a medical 
emergency. Id. 
141. 658 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1995). 
142. Id. at 337. 
J.L. [the biological mother] is 11/16 Indian blood and is a member of her 
father's tribe, the Cheyenne River Sioux. She was born on the Standing Rock 
Sioux Reservation in South Dakota (her mother's tribe), and lived there for 
nine years. After her father died, she moved with her mother and siblings off 
the reservation. Except for a short two-week stay with her aunt at Standing 
Rock in November 1994, she has not lived on a reservation since. 
Id. at 332. 
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culture and had provided no proof her child would be exposed to that 
culture. 143 
The Crews, Rye, and Hampton decisions raise difficult procedural 
questions for jurisdictions that follow the existing Indian family 
exception. Must the Indian parent and tribe affirmatively plead that the 
child will ultimately be united with its tribal culture to invoke applica-
tion of the ICWA? Does the "Indian parent'' need to be a member of a 
recognized tribe at the commencement of child custody proceedings?144 
Must the Indian family prove their "Indian-ness" by adopting traditional 
religion, dress, and language? Trial courts following the exception 
cannot look to the ICWA for guidance in answering these questions 
because the ICWA does not have a "cultural ties" requirement. A 1996 
decision from the California Court of Appeal, Second District is the first 
on the appellate level to address these questions. In In re Bridget 
R., 145 the appellate court adopted the existing Indian family exception 
(limited to a cultural ties requirement) and remanded an Indian child 
custody matter to the state trial court for proceedings to determine 
whether there was an existing Indian family. Bridget R. involved 
voluntary adoption proceedings for twin Indian girls. The Indian father, 
after initially lying about his Indian heritage, attempted to invoke the 
ICWA to revoke his voluntary consent to adoption of his twin chil-
dren.146 The tribe also sought to intervene once they received notice 
of the adoption.147 
143. Id. at 336-37. The court held: 
In sum, we find that the adoption of [the child] will not cause the breakup of 
an existing Indian family or removal of a child from an Indian environment. 
The child has never participated in Indian culture or heritage and more 
importantly based on the evidence presented, would not be exposed to such 
culture in the future even if returned to her biological mother or her family. 
Id. at 337. But cf. Owens v. Willock, No. 29,595-CA, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 375, at 
*7-8 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding Hampton distinguishable because the present case 
involved a tribal ward). "[T]he parties do not dispute the fact that this is a 'child 
custody proceeding', and ... stipulated that [the child] is a lineal descendant of [a] 
native village ... and, thus, would be an 'Indian child' under the ICW A. Since this is 
a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child, we conclude that the ICWA is 
applicable." Id. at *8-9. 
144. In concurrence Judge Anderson adopted this position. He stated that the 
definition of "Indian child" required that the Indian parent was a member of an Indian 
tribe. The Judge reasoned that it was membership, not ancestry, that triggered the 
application of the ICWA. Id. at 312-13. 
145. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996). 
146. Id. at 1493, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. The father initially told his attorney of 
his Indian heritage. His attorney told him this fact would impede the adoption 
proceedings. In further adoption proceedings he hid his Indian heritage. Id. 
141. Id. at 1495, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. 
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In adopting the existing Indian family exception, the court reasoned 
that the ICWA should not apply if neither the child nor the parent had 
lived on the reservation or maintained significant social, economic, or 
cultural ties to the tribe.148 The court held that constitutional limits on 
the ICWA required a finding by the trial court that the biological Indian 
parents had significant ties with their tribe, Indian community, or Indian 
culture. The court reasoned that without such ties, application of the 
ICWA based on the Indian child's membership or eligibility for 
membership runs afoul of the Constitution. First, the court held that 
application would interfere with rights ordinarily reserved to the states 
under the Tenth Amendment. Second, the court held that application 
would violate a child's right to due process and equal protection under 
the Fifth Amendment.149 
The court also established procedures for determining whether the 
child was part of an existing Indian family. First, the court held that the 
biological Indian parents and the tribe would bear the burden of proving 
the parents maintained significant ties to the tribe.150 Next, the court 
held that the ties must be between the Indian parent and the tribe and not 
between extended family members and the tribe. The court reasoned 
that the Indian parents should not be allowed to rely on ''blood relatives 
to bootstrap themselves into an application of ICWA."151 Finally, the 
court held that the determination of whether the Indian parents main-
tained significant ties with the tribe must be based on ties existing at the 
time they voluntarily relinquished their child.152 
148. Id. at 1500, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518. 
149. Bridget R. 41 Cal App. 4th at 1512, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529-30. 
150. Id. at 1513, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 530. The court reasoned that "[i]t is they who 
seek to set aside the relinquishment of parental rights which were otherwise final and 
binding under California law." Id. Ironically, this places the burden on the Indian 
parent to prove they are indeed Indian. 
151. Id. at 1514, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. The tribe contended that by focusing on 
the nuclear family, instead of the extended family the court once again ignores family 
dynamics the ICW A sought to protect The court dismisses this contention by essentially 
arguing that the Indian parents chose adoption instead of refuge with the tribe. Because 
they made a voluntary relinquishment, they must now prove they had a significant 
relationship with the tribe. However, the parents voluntary relinquishment of the 
children has nothing to do with their cultural ties. Additionally, the argument places the 
parents' desires for adoption over the tribe rights and interests in the Indian child. Id. 
See discussion infra Part IV.D.1. 
152. Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1514, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531. Note that under 
this requirement the mother in Crews would have been summarily denied application of 
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Courts have not universally adopted the Bridget R. court's procedural 
approach. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District adopted the 
existing Indian family exception in In re Alexandria Y.,153 but rejected 
the Bridget R. court's required findings of significant social, economic, 
or cultural ties to the tribe. Unwilling to limit the exception, the court 
held that a finding of an existing Indian family would "depend on the 
unique facts of each situation."154 
VI. A CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION 
A. Plain Language of the ICWA 
The first, and most serious, flaw of the existing Indian family 
exception is that it ignores the plain language of the ICWA. There are 
only two requirements for invocation of the ICWA. First, the child must 
be an Indian child. An Indian child is defined as a child who is a tribal 
member or a biological child of a tribal member and who is eligible for 
tribal membership. 155 There are no limitations on where the child 
resides or with whom a child lives.156 The second requirement to 
invoke the ICWA is that the proceeding must be a child custody 
proceeding. Child custody proceedings include foster care placement 
proceedings, termination of parental rights proceedings, preadoptive 
placement proceedings, and adoptive placement proceedings.157 There 
are only two exceptions to the definition of child custody proceedings: 
child custody proceedings in divorce matters and juvenile delinquency 
matters. 158 
Courts applying the existing Indian family exception add a third 
requirement for invocation of the ICWA, an Indian family. 159 Howev-
er, under general rules of statutory construction, express exceptions serve 
the ICWA. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
Id. 
153. 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1996). 
154. Id. at 1493, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686. The court stated: 
We agree with Bridget R. that recognition of the existing Indian family 
[exception] is necessary to avoid serious constitutional flaws in the ICWA. 
But we disagree with its holding that the [exception] cannot come into play 
unless the child and both his parents lack a significant relationship with Indian 
life. We are not willing to so limit the exception .•.• [W]hether there is an 
existing Indian family is dependent on the unique facts of each situation. 
155. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(4) (1994). 
156. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 932 (Id. 1993). 
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1994). See supra note 24. 
158. In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986). 
159. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
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to exclude any other exceptions. 160 If Congress had anticipated further 
exceptions to ICWA's application, it would have included them in the 
list of express exceptions.161 To the contrary, the ICWA contains no 
provision requiring an Indian child be part of an existing Indian family 
to trigger application of the ICWA. 
B. Congressional Intent 
The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception is that 
Congress only intended the ICWA to apply when an Indian child is 
removed from an existing Indian family. As authority for this congres-
sional intent argument, courts often cite the ICWA!s legislative 
history.162 Additionally, courts cite isolated provisions of the ICWA, 
including a portion of Congress' declared policy,163 a congressional 
finding, 164 and individual procedural provisions. 165 The citation of 
these authorities, however, is misleading. The courts skew the full 
meaning of the history and provisions by relying on isolated portions of 
these authorities. As the following sections will demonstrate, the 
ICWA's full legislative history, policy, findings, and provisions do not 
160. In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d at 156 (as authority for this proposition the 
court cites Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) and 2A Statutes 
and Statutory Construction § 47.11 at 145 (rev. 4th ed. 1984)). See also A.B.M. v. 
M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982); In re S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885 (S.D. 1982). 
161. See In re D.A.C. No. 950573-CA, 1997 LEXIS 17, at *17 (Ut App. Feb. 27, 
I 997) ("Congress created exceptions to application ofICW A for juvenile delinquency 
and divorce custody proceedings. Thus, Congress made policy decisions to limit 
application in other circumstances, but not in this situation.''). 
162. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982). 
163. Id. "Section 1902 of the Act makes it clear that it is the declared policy of 
Congress that the Act is to adopt minimum federal standards 'for the removal of Indian 
children from their [Indian] families."' Id. 
164. The court cites section 1901(4), stating that "an alarmingly high percentage of 
Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from 
them .... " Id. The court fails to reference section 1901(3) of the findings, which 
states that "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity 
of Indian tribes than their children .•. .'' 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994). The court also 
fails to reference section 1901(5), which states that "the States, exercising their 
recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings • . . have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people ... .'' 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) 
(1994). 
165. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (Those sections cited include: 
the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of section 191l(a); the preventative measures 
provisions of section 1912 (d); section 1912(e) and (f); and sections 1914, 1916(b), 1920, 
and 1922.). 
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support the existing Indian family exception and are in fact contrary to 
its basic premise and application. Congress' intent in enacting the 
ICWA was not limited to existing Indian families. 
1. Legislative History 
As previously stated, a primary argument courts applying the existing 
Indian family exception rely on is that the legislative history behind the 
ICWA supports the rationale for the exception.166 However, a full 
analysis of the legislative history cannot support this conclusion. The 
history of the ICWA shows that Congress was concerned with more than 
just the immediate effect the removal of an Indian child would have on 
a family. 
The House report accompanying the ICWA shows that Congress was 
concerned with the right of the child to participate in his valuable 
cultural heritage. 167 Congress addressed this concern in analyzing the 
propriety of defining "Indian child" as a potential tribal member instead 
of a current tribal member. Congress wished to assure that potential 
members were not denied their cultural heritage simply because their 
name did not yet appear on a tribal roll. 168 Congress was concerned 
with the rights of Indian children as Indians.169 Additionally, Congress 
was concerned about the long-term effects this removal would have on 
the Indian child and, on the child's tribe. Congress sought to ~rotect the 
Indian tribe's right to retain its children in tribal society.17 Finally, 
Congress was concerned about state courts' and agencies' inability to 
understand the dynamics of Indian tribal culture. Congress wished to 
insure that in certain circumstances state courts would not have 
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.171 Congress perceived the 
166. Id. at 175. 
167. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 7530, 
7539. The House Report specifically provides: 
[The] minor, perhaps infant, Indian does not have the capacity to initiate the 
formal mechanical, procedure necessary to become enrolled in his tribe to 
take advantage of the very valuable cultural and property benefits flowing 
therefrom. Obviously, Congress has power to act for their protection. The 
constitutional and plenary power of Congress over Indians and Indian tribes 
and affairs cannot be made to hinge upon the cranking into operation of a 
mechanical process established under tribal law, particularly with respect to 
Indian children who, because of their minority, cannot make a reasoned 
decision about their tribal and Indian identity. 
Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 45. 
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states as part of the problem it tried to correct in enacting the 
ICWA.172 Indeed, the main purpose of the statute is not to provide 
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 
families, but to curtail state authority over Indian child custody 
matters.173 
2. Declared Policy 
Courts also rely on individual ICWA provisions to support the 
rationale for the existing Indian family exception. The first provisions-
based argument is founded on Congress' policy and intent in enacting 
the ICWA. Supporters theorize that Congress' intent in enacting the 
ICWA was to provide minimum federal standards for the removal of 
Indian children from their homes. This interpretation of Congress' intent 
is derived from the policy declaration contained in the ICWA provisions. 
The provision establishes a two-fold congressional policy. First, 
Congress wished to protect the best interests of Indian children. Second, 
Congress desired to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families. Congress declared three ways this two-fold policy would 
be accomplished: first, by establishing minimum federal standards for 
the removal of Indian children from their families; second, by placing 
removed Indian children in foster or adoptive homes that reflected Indian 
values and culture; and third, by helping tribes operate child and family 
service programs.174 
The argument supporting the existing Indian family exception 
misconstrues the congressional policy by focusing on a single passage: 
minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 
families. But, considered in its entirety, Congress' policy concerns more 
than maintenance of familial relationships. Congress spoke of the 
Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 45 n. 17. 
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994). Section 1902 provides in full: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the 
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of 
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimwn Federal standards 
for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of 
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values 
of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the 
operation of child and family service programs. 
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interests of children, families, and tribes. Stability and security of the 
tribe was a primary concern. Limiting the application of the ICWA by 
applying the existing Indian family exception limits the security and 
stability of the tribe, which Congress wished to protect, by effectively 
stifling the tribe's voice in custody proceedings. 
3. Congressional Findings 
The second provisions-based argument used to support the existing 
Indian family exception rests on a congressional finding. Congress, in 
enacting the ICWA, recognized that a special relationship exists between 
the United States and American Indians.175 In recognition of this 
special relationship, Congress promulgated five findings regarding Indian 
children, families, and tribes. First, Congress found that the United 
States Constitution's Commerce Clause provided Congress plenary 
power over Indian affairs.176 Second, Congress found that it was 
responsible for the protection of tribal resources. m Third, Congress 
found that the Indian children are the tribes' most vital resource and that 
the United States has a direct interest in protecting those children who 
are Indian tribal members or eligible for membership.178 Fourth, 
Congress found that non-tribal agencies were removing Indian children 
from their families and placing them in non-Indian homes at an alarming 
rate.179 Fifth, Congress found that the states, in exercising jurisdiction 
175. 25 u.s.c. § 1901 (1994). See FELIX s. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 220-228 (1982) (discussing the trust relationship between the United States 
Government and the Indian tribes). 
176. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (1994). Section 1901(1) provides: "[C]lause 3, section 
8, article I of the United States Constitution provides that 'The Congress shall have 
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce .•. with Indian tribes and, through this and other 
constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs . . .. " Id. 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (omissions in original)). 
177. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (1994). Section 1901(2) provides: "Congress, through 
statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the 
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources . 
. . . " Id. 
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994). Section 1901(3) provides: "[T]here is no 
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity oflndian tribes than 
their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting 
Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 
.... " Id. 
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1994). Section 1901(4) provides: "[A]n alarmingly high 
percentage oflndian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their 
children from them by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high 
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and 
institutions .... " Id. 
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over Indian child custody matters, often failed to recognize tribal cultural 
and social standards.180 
Proponents of the existing Indian family exception cite the fourth 
finding as supporting Congress' supposed desire to limit the ICWA to 
cases involving an existing Indian family. This finding provides that 
Congress enacted the ICWA to stop the unwarranted removal of Indian 
children from their homes. However, the third finding provides that 
Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the tribes' interest in maintaining 
a relationship with its members and potential members.181 This finding 
was not limited to Indian children living in Indian families. The interest 
broadly encompassed current or potential tribal members. 
The findings also show Congress' suspicion of the state courts' ability 
to properly handle Indian child welfare matters.182 The existing Indian 
family exception's emphasis on a single Indian family is contrary to the 
overall tenor of the findings. Congress recognized the special relation-
ship between tribes and their members or even potential members, and 
found that state courts failed to recognize such relationships. The 
existing Indian family exception is continuing evidence of this failure. 
4. Procedural Provisions 
Courts supporting the existing Indian family exception also cite 
individual provisions of the ICWA as evidence of Congress' intent to 
limit application of the ICWA to existing Indian families. 183 Support-
ers cite the exclusive jurisdiction provisions for Indian children living on 
their reservation;184 provisions requiring remedial services prior to the 
breakup of an Indian family;185 provisions referring to continued 
180. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1994). Section 1901(5) provides: "[T]he States, 
exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through 
administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal 
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian 
communities and families." Id. 
I 8 I. See supra note 178. 
182. See supra note 180. 
183. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982). 
184. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 191l(a) provides exclusive 
jurisdiction in the Indian tribe 'over any child who resides or is domiciled within the 
reservation .... "' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)). 
185. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 1912(d) provides that efforts should 
be made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family .... " Id. 
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custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian;186 provisions 
referring to removal from the parent or Indian custodian;187 and other 
general placement or removal provisions.188 These provisions, support-
ers contend, show that the removal of children from existing Indian 
families and the breakup of those families is the underlying thread of the 
ICWA.189 
Once again, however, the argument supporting the existing Indian 
family exception fails to acknowledge provisions contrary to its position, 
Several provisions evidence Congress' intent to protect tribal interests as 
well as to maintain Indian families. First, tribal courts have concurrent, 
but preferred, jurisdiction over child custody matters regarding Indian 
children domiciled off the reservation. 190 Second, the tribe has the 
right to intervene at any time in state court proceedings over tribal 
members or potential tribal members.191 Third, state courts must give 
tribal court custody determinations full faith and credit.192 Fourth, 
state courts must notify tribes of pending custody matters involving 
tribal children.193 Further, an Indian child's relationship with its tribe 
is protected by allowing adult adopted children to seek information 
regarding their tribal affiliation.194 Finally, Congress appropriates 
funds for both on and off reservation Indian family service pro-
grams.195 These provisions evidence Congress' intent to protect tribal 
interests as well as to maintain Indian families. 196 
186. Id. The court specifically stated: "[S]ubsections (e) and (f) [of section 1912] 
refer to 'the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian' and the 
potential for emotional or physical damage to the child." Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1912(e)-(f)). 
187. Id. The court specifically stated: "Section 1914 again refers to the removal 
of the child from the parent or the Indian custodian." Id. 
188. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1916(b), 1920, 1922)). 
189. Id. The court specifically concluded: "[The provisions] reflect the underlying 
thread that runs throughout the entire Act to the effect that the Act is concerned with the 
removal oflndian children from an existing Indian family unit and the resultant breakup 
of the Indian family." Id. 
Id. 
190. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(b) (1994). 
191. 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(c) (1994). 
192. 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(d) (1994). 
193. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1994). 
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1917 (1994). Section 1917 specifically provides: 
Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the age of eighteen 
and who was the subject of an adoptive placement, the court which entered the 
final decree shall inform such individual of the tribal affiliation, if any, of the 
individual's biological parents and provide such other information as may be 
necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual's tribal relationship. 
195. 25 u.s.c. § 1933 (1994). 
196. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989), 
See also In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989) ("Reliance on a 
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The procedural provisions of the ICWA evidence nothing more than 
a plan for how Indian child custody proceedings will proceed. 
Provisions regarding Indian families should not be isolated to support the 
conclusion that the ICWA only applies to existing Indian families. The 
provisions of the ICWA must be interpreted in their entirety. The 
dominant theme of the ICWA, when viewed in its entirety, is to curtail 
state authority over Indian child custody matters.197 The procedural 
provisions therefore do not support the existing Indian family exception. 
The exception seeks to expand rather than to curtail state court authority. 
5. Failed Amendments 
Courts also reason that the Senate's failure to pass ICWA amendments 
in 1987 supports the proposition that Congress intended the ICWA to 
apply only to cases involving existing Indian families. Senate Bill 1976 
would have overruled the existing Indian family exception by making 
the ICWA's application "mandatory regardless of whether the child had 
'previously lived in Indian County, in an Indian cultural environment or 
with an Indian parent."'198 The bill, however, failed to leave the 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.199 This failure, certain courts 
contend, evidences Congress' awareness of the existing Indian family 
exception and, therefore, its support of the exception.200 
Contrary to this rationale, Congress' failure to amend the ICWA 
cannot provide a logical basis for concluding that Congress supports the 
existing Indian family exception. The courts espousing this theory offer 
no evidence that the 1987 amendments failed because Congress objected 
to the bill's rejection of the existing Indian family exception. The bill 
made sweeping changes to the ICWA, including adding and expanding 
requirement that the Indian child be part of an Indian family for the Act to apply would 
undercut the interests of Indian tribes and Indian children themselves that Congress 
sought to protect through notice, jurisdiction and other procedural protections set out in 
ICWA."). 
197. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45 n.17. 
198. In re Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935,945 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, Fort Peck 
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Tubridy, 116 S. Ct 1320 (1996) (quoting S. 1976, 100th 
Cong. § 4(1) (1987)). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. See also Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v. 
J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 {La. App. 1995), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995), 
and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 1549 (1996); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Okla. 1992). 
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definitions,2°1 allowing denial of transfer to tribal court when request 
to transfer was untimely,202 requiring notice for preadoptive and 
adoptive placement,203 establishing an Indian child welfare commit-
tee,204 and extending the ICWA to the aboriginal peoples of Cana-
da.205 It is paradoxical to conclude that Congress supports the existing 
Indian family exception because it failed to pass legislation that, among 
other things, would have overruled the exception.206 The better 
reasoned view is that the intent of the 100th Congress in failing to enact 
the amendments (whatever that intent may have been), cannot be 
ascribed to the earlier Congress which enacted the ICWA.207 
6. Supreme Court Interpretation 
The strongest blow to the existing Indian family exception comes from 
the only United States Supreme Court case to interpret the ICWA. In 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,208 the Supreme 
Court, in determining the effect of domicile on the ICWA, analyzed 
Congress' legislative intent in enacting the ICWA. 
20 I. S. 1976, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill, among other things, added definitions 
for "domicile" (Section 4(2)), "family" (Section 4(3)), "qualified expert witness" (Section 
4(1 I), and "residence" (Section 4(13); and expanded the definition of"parent" (Section 
4(10)). 
202. Id. § tol(b). 
203. Id. § 102(a). 
204. Id. § 114. 
205. Id. § 116. 
206. This paradox is evidenced by 104th Congress' failure to pass legislation which 
would have codified the existing Indian family exception. See supra notes 61-64 and 
accompanying text. Under the S.S. court's (and similar court's) rationale, this failure 
would evidence Congress' rejection of the existing Indian family exception. It is highly 
doubtful that the S.S. court, and its followers, would support such a result. 
207. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So.2d 331, 340-41 (La. App.) (Stewart J., 
dissenting), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 478 (La. 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1549 
(1996). "[T]he views ofa subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the 
intent of an earlier one." Id. at 340 (quoting Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989). Justice Stewart compared the failure of the ICWA 
amendments to the failure of ERISA amendments at issue in Bruch. The amendments 
concerned the standard of review in decisions denying insurance benefits. The failed 
ERISA bill proposed a de nova standard of review which was contrary to the arbitrary 
and capricious standard employed by most courts. Firestone argued that Congress' 
failure to approve the legislation evidenced Congress' support for the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. The Court rejected this argument stating "[t]he bill's demise may 
have had nothing to do with Congress's view on the propriety of de novo review. 
Without more, we cannot ascribe to Congress any acquiescence in the arbitrary and 
capricious standard." Id. (quoting Bruch, 489 U.S. at 103. Likewise, Justice Stewart 
concluded that "[ w]ithout more [be could not] ascribe such an intent to Congress, 
especially where the proposed amendments apparently were never placed before the 
whole Congress, but only a committee." Id. at 340-4 I. 
208. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
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Holyfield involved the adoption of illegitimate twin boys born on 
December 29, 1985. The unwed parents were both members of the 
Mississippi Band of the Choctaw Indians and were domiciled and 
resided on the tribal reservation. However, the twins were born in 
Harrison County, Mississippi, which is approximately 200 miles from 
the tribal reservation.209 On January 10, 1986, the mother consented 
to the adoption of the twins. The following day the father also 
consented to the adoption. A final decree of adoption issued on January 
28, 1986. The decree did not mention the twins' Indian heritage or the 
ICWA.210 
Two months later the Choctaw tribe alleged exclusive jurisdiction over 
the twins and petitioned the court to vacate the adoption decree. The 
trial court overruled the petition stating the tribe never established 
jurisdiction because the twins were never physically on the reservation 
and because the mother went to great lengths to leave the reservation 
before giving birth to the twins. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirmed this order.211 
On review, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the tribe had 
exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. Jurisdiction under 
the ICWA, the Court stated, is based on the domicile of the child. The 
Mississippi court had applied state law to conclude that the twins were 
domiciled in Harrison County. This application of state law, the Court 
held, was not appropriate to determine a pivotal issue of the ICWA. The 
Court instead applied the general common law that the domicile of a 
child follows his mother. Because neither party ever disputed that both 
parents were domiciled on the reservation, the Court granted exclusive 
jurisdiction to the tribe. 
In granting the tribe exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
analyzed not only the policy behind the ICWA, but the tribe's place in 
the ICWA. The purpose of the ICWA, the Court noted, was not simply 
to curb the removal of Indian children from Indian homes, but to protect 
those children's rights and the tribe's right to retain Indian children in 
209. The record on appeal reveals that the biological parents intentionally left the 
reservation prior to the birth of the twins in an attempt to avoid application of the ICW A 
in the intended adoption proceedings. Id. at 40. 
210. Id. at 38. 
211. Id. at 39. 
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tribal society.212 Additionally, the Court noted that Congress was 
concerned that the actions of state authorities often infringed these rights. 
According to the Court, states and their courts were part of the problem 
Congress was attempting to remedy in enacting the ICWA.213 Because 
of these concerns, the court reasoned, Congress would not have left the 
pivotal jurisdictional issue (the definition of domicile) to interpretation 
by state courts based on state law.214 
The Court's analysis of where the child's tribe fits into the ICWA 
shows a strong concern for tribal rights. First, the ICWA was intended 
to protect not just Indian children and parents, but also to protect the 
child's tribe.215 Evidence of this intent is found in the numerous rights 
granted to tribes under the ICWA. Second, this tribal interest is at least 
equal to the interest of the individual Indian parents. Not only do tribes 
have a recognized interest under the ICWA, but that interest is the core 
of the Act.216 The actions of individual tribal members cannot defeat 
this tribal interest.217 
Finally, the Court recognized the detrimental impact on Indian children 
of being raised in non-Indian homes. The Court reasoned that this 
impact is a concern that reaches beyond the individual parents.218 
Removing an Indian child from tribal culture causes not only social, but 
212. Id. at 37. The Court specifically stated: "The ICWA thus ... 'seeks to 
protect the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community 
and tribe in retaining its children in its society."' Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 
23 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7546), 
213. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35-36. The Court stated: "'[T]he states['] ... judicial 
bodies[ J have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations oflndian people and 
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families."' Id. 
(quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)). 
214. Id. at 45-47. Additionally, the lack of unifonnity caused by a state law 
domicile definition supported a single unifonn definition. If courts used a state law 
definition, tribal jurisdiction over children born off the reservation would vary by state. 
Mothers, wishing to avoid the ICW A, could simply cross state lines prior to giving birth. 
Id. 
215. Id. at 49. The Court specifically stated: "Congress was concerned not solely 
about the interest ofindian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes 
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." Id. 
216. Id. at 52. The court specifically stated: 
The protection of this tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which 
recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but 
on a parity with the interest of the parents. This relationship between Indian 
tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in 
other ethnic cultures found in the United States. 
Id. (citing In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70 (Utah 1986)). 
217. Id. 
218. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50-51. 
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psychological, damage to many Indian children.219 The Court not only 
concluded that it was in the Indian child's best interest to maintain its 
relationship to the tribe, but that the ICWA was based on this assump-
tion.220 
The Supreme Court's analysis of the ICWA is directly contrary to the 
basic premise of the existing Indian family exception. The exception 
theorizes that the intent of Congress in enacting the ICWA was to 
provide minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children 
from existing Indian families. However, the Supreme Court stated that 
the ICWNs main purpose is to protect the rights of the child and the 
tribe. The concern behind the ICWA is not simply a family concern but 
a community concern. The Congress established the ICWA to aid tribes 
in retaining Indian children in the Indian community. By focusing on 
families, the exception denies protection of any potential relationship 
between the child and the tribe. 
Indeed, several courts have held that Holyfield implicitly overrules the 
existing Indian family exception.221 These courts reason that the 
existing Indian family exception places too much weight on the interests 
of individual families.222 Citing Holyfield s extensive review of the 
ICWA's legislative history, these courts hold that the exception is 
contrary to the tribal interests and sovereignty Congress sought to protect 
and strengthen through the ICWA.223 Similarly, one court upholding 
219. Id. The Court specifically stated: "'Removal of Indian children from their 
cultural setting seriously impacts a long-term tribal survival and has damaging social and 
psychological impact on many individual Indian children."' Id. ( quoting S. REP. No. 
597, 95th Cong. 52 (1977)). Testimony at congressional hearings provided that the 
psychological damage was due not only to the initial removal, but to the effect of being 
a racial Indian in a non-Indian community. See Indian Child Welfare Program, 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs 93rd Cong. 54 (1974) (statement of Dr. Carl Mindell, child psychiatrist). 
220. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 50 n.24. 
221. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993); In re Adoption of 
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990); In re Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Mich. 
1996). Cf. In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206, 208-09 (Or. App. 1992) (citing 
Holyfield for the proposition that the existing Indian family exception is contrary to the 
policies Congress sought to protect through the ICWA.) 
222. Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489 ("[I]t is incorrect, when assessing ICWA's 
applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the interests of an existing family."). 
223. Elliot, 554 N.W.2d at 36-37 ("In light of the [Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Holyfield], we hold that an 'existing Indian family' exception would be in direct conflict 
with the concept of tribal sovereignty and the important public policy of improving tribal 
ties reflected in the ICW A."). 
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the existing Indian family exception has recognized that Holyfield at 
least limits the exception. In In re Bridget R., a California appellate 
court held that Holyfield limits the exception's application to cases where 
the court finds the parent or child does not have significant social, 
political, or cultural ties to the tribe. The exception, this court held, 
cannot be used to defeat the ICWA's application merely because the 
child has never lived with an Indian family.224 
C. ·Tribal Interests 
As previously discussed, the basic premise of the existing Indian 
family exception is flawed because it is contrary to the ICWA's full 
congressional intent. These flaws are additionally evidenced by the 
exception's infringement upon tribal interests recognized by the ICWA 
and the Supreme Court in Holyfield. By applying the exception, the 
Indian child's tribe is deprived of its right to intervene in child custody 
matters. Courts adopting the exception fail or refuse to recognize the 
tribal interests Congress intended to protect in enacting the ICWA. 
One case that recognized the tribal interests protected under the ICWA 
is In re S.B.R.225 In In re S.B.R., the court refused to follow the 
existing Indian family exception because, in addition to ignoring the 
plain language of the ICWA, it ignored tribal interests in Indian child 
custody matters. The court concluded that tribes are to play a central 
role in custody proceedings of Indian children.226 The court further 
concluded that the legislative findings failed to support the existing 
Indian family exception as they include findings that the relationship 
between the child and the tribe should be protected.227 To protect the 
values Congress recognized in adopting the ICWA, the court reasoned, 
224. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1500-01, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 521-22 
(1996) ("Holyfield establishes, by clear implication, that an application of ICWA will 
not be defeated by the mere fact that an Indian child has not himself (or herself) been 
part ofan Indian family or community."), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct. 
693 (1997). But cf. In re Alexandria Y. 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1493, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
679, 686 (1996) ("[W]e disagree with [Bridget R. s] holding that the [existing Indian 
family exception] cannot come into play unless the child and both parents lack a 
significant relationship with Indian life. We are not willing to so limit the [exception] 
.... [W]hether there is an existing Indian family is dependent on the unique facts of 
each situation."). 
225. 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. App. 1986). 
226. Id. at I 56. 
227. Id. The court specifically stated: "It is in the Indian child's best interest that 
its relationship to its tribe be protected." Id. 
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the tribes must be allowed to participate in Indian child custody 
matters.228 
Interestingly, In re S.B.R. differs in two ways from other cases that 
apply the exception to adoption proceedings involving illegitimate Indian 
children: first, the party appealing is the Indian tribe not the Indian 
father; and second, the proceeding involves custody within the extended 
maternal family.229 Perhaps the tribe's strong presence in the matter 
resulted in the decision recognizing tribal rights and interests.230 
However, presence of strong tribal interests is not necessarily enough 
to overcome application of the exception. For example, in Adoption of 
Baby Boy D., the court, in adopting the existing Indian family exception, 
placed special emphasis on the fact that the father had expressed little 
interest in the child.231 However, the dissent recognized that tribal 
concerns should not be ignored by applying the existing Indian family 
exception. In his dissent,232 Judge Kauger reasoned that a strict 
interpretation required application of the ICWA.233 Judge Kauger 
stated that the majority failed to consider the tribal concerns due to an 
(albeit well-meaning) cultural myopia.234 Child-rearing, the Judge 
reasoned, is an essential tribal function. Judge Kauger further reasoned 
that Congress recognized this function in section 191l(b) of the ICWA 
by requiring transfer to the tribal court when the child is domiciled off 
the reservation.235 This provision, he stated, is evidence that the 
child's tribal status overrides his domiciliary status.236 Additionally, 
228. Id. Judge Swanson dissented to the majority opinion. He opined that the 
ICWA's rigid application overturned a lower court order simply because the tribe had 
not received notice of the proceedings. Id. at 157. 
229. Id. at 155. 
230. The father initially objected to the proceedings, but failed to appear at trial and 
apparently made no further attempts to intervene in the matter. 
231. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985). 
232. Judge Kauger's dissent is partial and only applies to the majority's treatment 
and holdings regarding the ICW A. Id. at I 071. 
233. Id. at 1073. 
234. Id. at 1075. 
235. Id. at 1076. Section 191 l(b) states: "In any State court proceeding ... 
[involving] an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian 
child's tribe, the court ... shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe 
.... " 25 U.S.C. 191 l(b) (1994). 
236. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1076. 
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Judge Kauger noted that the ICWA makes no distinction regarding a 
child's environmental circumstances.237 
The New Jersey Supreme Court used a similar rational to refuse 
application of the exception in In re Adoption of a Child of Indian 
Heritage.238 In Child of Indian Heritage, an unwed Indian mother 
placed her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian family. The 
Indian father and extended family subsequently attempted to vacate the 
adoption because it violated the ICWA.239 The mother argued that the 
ICWA should not apply because the child's voluntary placement was not 
a removal of an Indian child from an Indian family and, therefore, did 
not result in the break up of an existing Indian family.240 The court, 
however, rejected this argument because it would allow the mother's 
voluntary conduct to dictate the ICWNs application.241 Instead, the 
court emphasized the rights of the unwed father, the tribe, and the effect 
on an Indian child in being placed in a non-Indian home. The effect on 
the Indian child and the tribe, the court theorized, was the same whether 
the placement by the non-Indian mother was voluntary or not.242 
Congress, the court stated, intended to maintain the relationship between 
the Indian child and tribe whenever possible.243 The court held that 
the existing Indian family exception was contrary to the purpose of the 
ICWA. The congressional findings, the court noted, recognized that the 
Indian children were the tribes' most vital resource in continuing their 
existence. 244 
237. Id. 
238. 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988). 
239. Id. at 928-30. The Indian mother voluntarily arranged for her baby's adoption 
prior to his birth on August 17, 1984. On May 24, 1985, the trial court granted the 
baby's adoption by a non-Indian couple. The trial court did not apply the ICWA, and 
in fact, at no point in the proceedings was there any indication that the child was Indian. 
On May 23, 1986, the Indian father moved to vacate the adoption on the basis offraud 
and the court's failure to follow the JCW A. Although the tribe declined to intervene due 
to a lack of funds, the father's extended Indian family joined him in his attempts to 
vacate the adoption. 
240. Id. at 931-32. 
241. Id. at 932. The court specifically stated: "We disagree with this interpretation 
of the Act because it posits as a detenninative jurisdictional test the voluntariness of the 
conduct of the mother." Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 932. The court stated: "[C]onsideration 
must also be given to the rights of the child's father and Congress' belief that, whenever 
possible, it is in an Indian child's best interests to maintain a relationship with his or her 
tribe." Id. 
244. Id. "'[T)here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and 
integrity of Indian tribes than their children and . . . the United States has a direct 
interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children ...• "' Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)-
(3)). 
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield245 also supports the concern that the 
ICWA must be applied to support the interests of the tribe. The 
Holyfield decision demostrates that the existing Indian family exception 
cannot be used to allow individual actions to evade application of the 
ICWA. At least one court has reversed its support for the exception 
based on the broad scope of the ICWA envisioned by the Supreme Court 
in Holyfield. 
Prior to Holyfield, the South Dakota Supreme Court had applied the 
existing Indian family exception to a factual situation involving an 
adoption by a non-Indian mother's current husband. In that case, 
Claymore v. Se",246 the court held that before it could apply the 
ICWA, it must first find that the child was a member of an existing 
Indian family.247 The court reasoned that although the ICWA did not 
specifically require an existing Indian family, such a requirement was 
implicit in the ICWA.248 However, following Holyfield the South 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed its support for the exception. In In re 
Adoption of Baade, 249 the court held that in light of Holyfield, it was 
245. 490 U.S. 30 (I 989). 
246. 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987). This case centered around the adoption of an 
Indian child (Danette) by the husband of her non-Indian mother (Janette Johnson Serr). 
Serr gave birth to Danette in 1977. Danette's biological father (Shayne Claymore) was 
an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. Although, Claymore never 
monetarily contributed to the child's expenses he visited Serr and Danette and 
occasionally lived with them. His relationship with mother and daughter did not cease 
until Serr began living with her future husband. When Claymore learned of the intended 
adoption, he objected and sought to legally establish paternity, child support, and 
visitation. He did not attempt to gain custody of Danette. Id. at 651-52. 
247. Id. at 654. The court specifically stated: "We believe that the purpose of[sic] 
Act suggests that such a finding is a necessary condition for application of the Act" Id. 
248. Id. at 653-54. The court also attempted to define Indian family. Acknowledg-
ing that the ICW A does not provide a definition, the court looked to Black's Law 
Dictionary. Black's stated that, although the definition of family depends on the field 
of law in question, it generally consists of parents and children. Based on this the court 
concluded that the definition of an Indian family was that of a typical Anglo-nuclear 
family. The court acknowledged that situations may exist where an Indian child was not 
part of a parent and child unit such as where the child was raised by grandparents. But, 
the court concluded that because that was not the situation before it, Danette could not 
be considered part of an existing Indian family. Id. 
249. 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990) (involving a teenaged Indian father's objection 
to his child's adoption). 
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incorrect to apply the ICWA only to cases involving an existing 
family.250 The Baade court noted that the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the ICWA in Holyfield encompassed not only the child and the 
family's interests, but the interests of the tribe as well.251 The Baade 
court rejected the Baby Boy L. line of cases and adopted the position that 
the only prerequisites to application of the ICWA were whether the child 
was an "Indian child" and whether the proceeding was a "child custody 
proceeding."252 
This position was also recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Baby Boy Doe.253 The court determined that Holyfield effectively 
undermined the exception's requirement of an existing Indian fami-
ly.254 The Baby Boy Doe court summarized that the Supreme Court's 
application of the ICWA in Holyfield was based on the interest the tribe 
has in the tribal children.255 The existing Indian family exception 
deprives the tribe of this interest. Under the exception, the court 
theorized, a non-Indian mother can easily circumvent the ICWA by 
assuring the child has no contact with his father, his family, or any tribal 
culture.256 The court further rejected the exception because the ICWA 
contained no limitations based on a child's location.257 The court 
250. Id. at 489. The court specifically stated: "Consequently, it is incorrect, when 
assessing ICWA's applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the interest of 
an e1:isting family." Id. 
251. Id. The Baade court specifically quoted Holyfield as follows. '"The numerous 
prerogatives accorded the tribe through the ICW A's substantive provision ... must, 
accordingly, be seen as a means of protecting not only the interests of individual Indian 
children and families, but also the tribes themselves."' Id. (quoting Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49) (omissions in original). 
252. Id. at 489-90. 
253. 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993). Baby Boy Doe involved a non-Indian mother's 
placing her Indian child for adoption with a non-Indian family. Following notice of the 
adoption proceedings, the father and tribe petitioned to intervene in the proceedings. Id. 
at 927-28. The tribe objected to placement in compliance with the ICWA's placement 
preferences. To avoid the ICWA's placement preferences the trial court adopted the 
existing Indian family exception. Id. 
254. Id. at 933. Alternatively, the trial court had ruled that the child was not an 
"Indian child" because the tribe had not conclusively detennined the child was eligible 
for membership. Id. at 928. The Court ruled that the trial court misapplied the law in 
requiring the tribe to make a conclusive detennination that the child was eligible for 
membership to invoke the ICW A. Id. at 930-3 I. 
255. Id. at 931. 
256. Id. The Baby Boy Doe court specifically stated: "In this case, application of 
an Indian family requirement would allow the non-Indian mother to circumvent 
application ofICW A and the tribe's interest in the child by making sure the child is kept 
away from the reservation and out of contact with the father and his family." Id. 
257. Id. at 932. 
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concluded that the existing Indian family exception was a judicially 
created exception to the ICWA.258 
A California Court of Appeal has also reversed a trial court's attempt 
to follow the existing Indian family exception. In Adoption of Lindsay 
C., 259 the First District Court of Appeal, Division Three, relied on 
Holyfield and the express provisions of the ICWA to find that the only 
two exceptions to the ICWA were divorce proceedings and juvenile 
delinquency proceedings. The court noted the conclusion of one 
commentator that the Baby Boy L. court "may have given inappropriate 
weight to the wishes of the family."260 The court added that limiting 
the application of the ICWA to situations involving removal of Indian 
children from existing Indian homes, deprecated the very purpose of the 
ICWA-namely, to preserve the parental, tribal, and cultural link to the 
Indian child.261 
Despite Holyfield, numerous courts steadfastly refuse to accept 
Holyfield and the above-described cases as defeating the existing Indian 
family exception. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in In re 
S.C.,262 held that the exception was not inconsistent with Holyfield. 
258. Id. The court reasoned that "In light of the structure and nature of ICW A, it 
is inappropriate to use a judicially created exception to circumvent the mandates of 
ICWA." Id. 
259. 229 Cal. App. 3d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (1991) (involving an adoption of 
an illegitimate Indian child by the non-Indian mother's current husband). 
260. Id. at 412,280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (quoting Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian 
Child Weijare Act of 1978: A practical Guide with [Limited] Commentary 34 S.D. L. 
Rev. 660, 671 (1989). The full quote provided: "After the decision in Holy.field, it 
appears that the Kansas court in Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to 
the wishes of the family. The United States Supreme Court seems unlikely to protect 
the implied right of the non-Indian mother to entirely exclude the applicability of the Act 
which explicitly protects the right of a tribe to intervene in any child custody proceeding 
involving an Indian child." Id. 
261. Id. at 414, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 200 ( quoting In re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3d 
655, 664, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 624 (1991)). In re Crystal K. involved a trial court's 
refusal to apply the ICW A to a proceeding tenninating a non-custodial Indian father's 
parental rights because the matter was within the definition of the divorce proceeding 
exception. In re Crystal K., 226 Cal. App. 3rd at 662-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 623. The 
court rejected this interpretation and reasoned that Holy.field required a broader 
interpretation of the ICW A. Id. at 665, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 625. 
262. 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992). In re. S.C. involved the objection to the foster 
care placement of two Cherokee Indian children by their Indian father. The children, 
following their removal from their non-Indian mother, were placed in an Indian foster 
care home. The Cherokee tribe approved of the placement of the children and only 
requested the father be granted visitation. On appeal the father sought to invalidate the 
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Holyfield, the court stated, stood for only two propositions: (1) Federal 
law determines the definition of domicile; and (2) domicile of an 
illegitimate child is the domicile of the mother.263 The court insisted 
that Holyfield must be considered in light of the ICWA's legislative 
history and other state court decisions which confined the application of 
Holyfield to the two stated propositions.264 However, as previously 
explained, the legislative history does not support the exception.265 In 
fact, when viewed in its entirety the history supports applying the 
Holyfield rational to defeat the exception. The better view is that the 
exception is contrary to the interests tribes have in Indian child custody. 
The exception should not be applied to deny tribes this interest. 
D. Urban Indians 
I. Application Issues 
Related to the tribal rights issue is the recent trend of applying the 
existing Indian family exception to urban Indians who lack sufficient 
cultural ties. This trend of applying the exception when courts 
determine that the Indian parent does not have sufficient ties to tribal 
culture or the reservation is perhaps the most far reaching and dangerous 
of the applications. Application in this situation places an additional, 
and unwarranted, burden on urban Indians simply because they do not 
live on or near the reservation. Indian parents who, through choice or 
placement under section 1914, alleging errors in the trial court proceedings. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court not only held that there were no errors justifying invalidation 
under the ICW A, but (perhaps unnecessarily) reinforced its strong support for the 
existing Indian family exception. Id. at 1251-52. However, the Oklahoma Legislature 
subsequently rejected the existing Indian family exception. OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 10 
§ 40.1 (West Supp. 1997) ("It shall be the policy of the state to recognize that Indian 
tribes and nations have a valid governmental interest in Indian children regardless of 
whether or not said children are in the physical or legal custody of an Indian parent or 
Indian custodian at the time state proceedings are initiated."). 
263. Id. at 1254. The court specifically stated that "Holyfield stands for two 
propositions: (!) that federal law pre-empts state law as to the definition of domicile, 
and (2) the domicile of an Indian child is that of the mother if the child is born our of 
wedlock." Id. 
264. Id. at 1254. To support its proposition that other courts have similarly 
confined Holyfield, the court cites In re T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 82 (Mont. 1990) and In re 
Termination of the Parental Rights of D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind, 1991). However, 
D.S. does not conclusively limit Holyfield to such an application. In fact, the D.S. court 
rejected the existing Indian family exception. D.S., 577 N.E.2d at 574 ("We •. , hold 
that a mother and child do constitute a 'family'. Furthermore, where the mother is a 
Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least presumptively for purposes of 
initiating ICW A inquiries, constitute an 'Indian family."'), 
265. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
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circumstance, no longer live on the reservation must prove their "Indian-
ness" to courts applying the exception to assure the ICWA's application. 
However, this proof requirement is contrary to both Congress' intent in 
enacting the ICWA and the plain language of the ICWA. 
The ICWA defines Indian as a "person who is a member of an Indian 
tribe .... "266 The ICWA has no limits regarding where that person 
must live or what type of cultural activities they must practice. As 
Judge Kauger noted in his dissent to Baby Boy D., the ICWA makes no 
distinction regarding a child's environmental circumstances.267 In fact, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress addressed a similar 
question when determining the proper definition of an Indian child. The 
Department of Justice, after reviewing the proposed ICWA, recommend-
ed that the definition of Indian child be limited to children who were 
eligible for membership and in the custody of a tribal parent.268 The 
legislature rejected the recommendation. It reasoned that blood 
relationship, not the environment of the child, determined the child's 
right to participate in tribal culture and property benefits.269 
State courts that require tribal cultural ties before they will invoke the 
ICWA will open a Pandora's Box of unanswerable questions. How will 
state courts determine who is Indian? Will the exception be limited to 
urban Indians? Will domicile on a reservation be sufficient? What if 
the parent is domiciled on the reservation, but does not participate in 
tribal customs or activities? Will they be considered Indian? Must a 
parent prove they have attended a significant number of powwows, 
sweat lodges, or council meetings before they are considered Indian? 
Will tribal experts be called to testify to individual tribal customs? 
The major fallacy of this application of the existing Indian family 
exception is that it places the decision of who is an Indian with the 
entity least equipped to make the decision, the state court. As noted in 
Holyfield, Congress perceived the state courts' inability to understand 
Indian cultural and tribal dynamics as part of the problem it was 
266. 25 u.s.c. § 1903(3) (1994). 
267. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985). 
268. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 39 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7562. 
269. Id. at 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7543. The House Report 
specifically provides: "Blood relationship is the very touchstone of a person's right to 
share in the cultural and property benefits of an Indian tribe." Id. 
427 
attempting to correct by enacting the ICWA.270 It is highly doubtful 
Congress intended such a pivotal decision be placed with an entity it 
perceived as not understanding the basics of being Indian.271 
Congress' only requirement for a finding that a person is Indian is tribal 
membership. This leaves the decision of who is part of their tribal 
culture with the tribe. Thus, the entity most capable of determining the 
significance of a person's ties to the tribe is the one making the decision. 
Under this analysis of the ICWA, the cultural ties requirement could 
never be used to evade tribal rights. When a tribe attempts to intervene 
in an Indian child custody matter, it is obvious they consider the child 
and the Indian parent part of the tribe. In fact, even if the tribe does not 
attempt to intervene, the child's place in the tribe is demonstrated by the 
child's membership or eligibility for membership with the tribe.272 
Requiring that the parent have significant ties to the tribe ignores the 
direct relationship between the Indian child and the Indian tribe. The 
Court in Holyfield noted that Congress was concerned with the tribes' 
rights as well as the children's and parents' rights.273 Requiring a 
finding that the Indian parent participate in tribal cultural activities 
would allow an individual parent to defeat application of the ICWA. 
The parent could simply claim she did not participate in cultural 
activities to avoid application of the ICWA. As the Court in Holyfield 
states, these individual actions cannot be used to defeat application of 
the ICWA.274 
270. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45. See also In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 
977-78 (Alaska 1989) (noting that "[s]tate courts must be particularly hesitant in creating 
judicial exceptions to a federal act which was enacted to counter state courts' prejudicial 
treatment of Indian children and communities.''). 
271. See ln re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (Or. App. 1992) 
("Engrafting a new requirement into ICWA that allows the dominant society to judge 
whether the parent's cultural background meets its view of what 'Indian culture' should 




If the tribe has a right to intervene, or to assert jurisdiction of its o,m court, 
it may well decide that a child who meets the definition of Indian child, 
although born of parents who are not in an "existing Indian cultural setting," 
should be returned to the tribe rather than being placed in a non-Indian 
adoptive home. That is the tribe's, not the state court's, decision. 
273. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989). 
274. Id. at 51 (citing In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 
931-33 (N.J. 1988)) (allowing the Indian parents' actions to defeat jurisdictional 
provisions would be inconsistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the ICWA). 
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2. Constitutional Issues 
A recent California appellate court decision adds a constitutional 
dimension to the ICWA:s application to urban Indians.275 The court 
in In re Bridget R.216 held that the ICWA violates the Fifth, Four-
teenth, and Tenth Amendments when it is applied to children and 
families who have weak cultural ties. 
a. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The first constitutional argument the Bridget R. court made was that 
application of the ICWA to families with weak cultural ties violates the 
Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying the Indian 
child's right to due process and equal protection of the laws.277 The 
child's substantive due process rights are implicated, the court stated, 
because the child is the only party with a fundamental, constitutionally 
protected interest. This interest is, according to the court, the protection 
of the child's relationship with the adoptive family.278 The equal 
protection right is triggered, the court stated, when the ICWA treats 
Indian children differently from similarly situated children on the sole 
basis of the Indian child's genetic heritage. According to the court, the 
child's due process and equal protection rights are not infringed upon if 
the ICWA:s application is based on the Indian child's cultural heri-
tage.279 Therefore, the court theorized, the ICWA, when applied to 
families with weak cultural ties, must pass a heightened scrutiny test. 
First, application must serve a compelling governmental interest, and 
275. Notably, in the ICWA's eighteen-year history, no other court has held that the 
ICWA's application violates any constitutionally protected interest. 
276. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (1996). 
277. Id. at 1502, 1507-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522, 526-27. 
278. Id. The court stated "the twins do have a presently existing fundamental and 
constitutionally protected interest in their relationship with the only family they have 
ever !mown." Id. at 1507, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526. However, whether adoptive children 
have a fundamental right to protect their relationship with an adoptive family is far from 
a settled issue. An analysis of these interests is beyond the scope of this Comment. For 
a discussion on the conflict between parent and child rights see Marian L. Faupel, The 
"Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between Children's and Parents' Rights, 
40 WAYNE L. REV. 285 (1994). 
279. Id. at 1507-08, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526-27. 
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second, such application must be necessary to further that interest.280 
However, this heightened scrutiny test for legislation regarding Indians 
and Indian tribes is contrary to the Fifth Amendment test proscribed by 
the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari.28 Additional-
ly, this test ignores the plenary power of Congress to regulate matters 
involving Indians and the distinct political (as opposed to racial) 
classification of Indians. 
In Morton v. Mancari, non-Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs job 
applicants attacked the constitutionality of the Bureau's Indian hiring 
preferences. These preferences, the non-Indian applicants argued, 
allowed special treatment for Indians in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.282 The Court, however, held that the hiring preferences did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment.283 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
focused on the special relationship between Congress and the tribes, and 
Congress' plenary power to legislate regarding Indians.284 Due to this 
unique relationship and plenary power, the Court held, Congress may 
single out Indians for separate treatment.285 The Court noted that on 
numerous occasions it had "upheld legislation that singles out Indians for 
particular and special treatment."286 This treatment, the Court opined, 
was not a racially based treatment, but a politically based treatment. The 
Court noted that only Indians who were tribal members received the 
special treatment.287 Finally, the Court concluded that the due process 
test in such matters was whether the legislation was rationally related to 
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians. If rational, the 
280. Id. 
281. 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). It should be noted that even under the court's 
heightened scrutiny test, the ICWA's application to tribal members should pass 
constitutional muster. See discussion infra pp. 67-71 (arguing that application meets a 
heightened scrutiny test under the Tenth Amendment). 
Id. 
282. Id. at 539. 
283. Id. at 555. 
284. Id. at 551-52. The Court specifically stated: 
Resolution of the instant issue turns on the unique legal status oflndian tribes 
under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history 
of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status, to legislate on 
behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Congress 
to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and 
implicitly from the Constitution itself. 
285. Id. at 552. 
286. Id. at 554-55 
287. Id. at 553 n.24. The Court specifically stated: "The preference is not directed 
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 
'federally recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially 
to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial 
in nature." Id. 
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Court would not disturb the legislature's judgment.288 Thus, the 
appropriate Fifth Amendment test to determine the constitutionality of 
the ICWNs application to families with weak cultural ties is whether 
such application is rationally related to Congress' unique obligation to 
Indians. 
At least one court has rejected constitutional due process and equal 
protection attacks where the ICWA has been applied to Indians who 
lived in urban areas isolated from tribal culture. In In re Armell, 289 an 
Illinois appeal court relied on Congress' plenary power and Morton v. 
Mancari to hold that the ICWA did not violate an Indian child's due 
process and equal protection rights. First, the court concluded that the 
ICWNs application had not infringed upon the Indian child's equal 
protection rights. The ICWA, the court stated, did not classify Indians 
as a racial group, but as a political group outside the scope of an equal 
protection attack. Supporting the conclusion, the court reasoned, was 
Congress' plenary power to regulate Indians either on or off the 
reservation.290 The court held that Congress' judgment regarding such 
regulation would not be disturbed if it was rationally tied to the 
execution of Congress' unique obligation to the Indians.291 The court 
concluded that this test was met as the ICWA, in application, was 
essential to protect tribal culture and to assure the existence of Indian 
tribes.292 
The court also concluded that the ICWNs application to urban Indians 
did not infringe upon the child's due process rights. The court held that 
the child's lack of contact with the tribe had no bearing on a due process 
288. Id. at 555. The Court specifically stated: "As long as the special treatment 
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the 
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id. 
289. 550 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct 1990). Armel[ involved a three and one-half 
year-old Indian child who was found rummaging through a garbage can in metropolitan 
Chicago. Social services was granted temporary custody of the Indian child who was 
then placed with a foster family. Following notice, the child's tribe petitioned to transfer 
jurisdiction to its tribal court. At the time of notice to the child's tribe, the child was 
not an enrolled tribal member, but was eligible for enrollment Following the tribe's 
petition to transfer jurisdiction to tribal court, they enrolled the child as a tribal member. 
The Indian child's attorney objected to transfer to tribal court Id. at 1062-63. 
290. Id. at 1067-68. 
291. Id. at 1068. 
292. Id. at 1067-68. The court specifically stated: "The provisions of the ICWA 
were deemed by Congress to be essential for the protection of Indian culture and to 
assure the very existence oflndian tribes." Id. at 1068. 
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claim. The court opined that the ICWA was designed to protect tribal 
members domiciled both on and off the reservation.293 Holyfield, the 
court reasoned, supported this conclusion as the Supreme Court upheld 
tribal jurisdiction even though the parents did not want tribal involve-
ment and the child had never had contact with the tribe.294 
This rationale equally applies to matters involving the children of 
urban Indians who may not have strong cultural ties. By recognizing a 
bond between an Indian child and his tribe, the ICWA seeks to protect 
tribal culture and to assure the existence of Indian tribes. The tribe in 
this situation has an even stronger interest in maintaining a relationship 
with the Indian child. Presumably, the Indian child, through no fault of 
his own, has been denied exposure to his cultural heritage. By 
recognizing an interest between this Indian child and his tribe, the ICWA 
affords the tribe an opportunity to rectify the situation. Recognition of 
the tribal interest is of particular importance when considered in light of 
past assimilationist policies which may have resulted in the Indian 
parents' lack of cultural ties.295 By denying application of the ICWA 
to urban Indians who may lack strong cultural ties, a court fserpetuates 
assimilationist policies designed to extinguish tribal culture. 96 
Additionally, Congress, in enacting the ICWA, recognized the 
importance of the bond between the Indian child and his tribe. In fact, 
this bond was so important that it warranted application of the ICWA to 
children who were not current tribal members, but only eligible for 
293. Id. The court specifically stated: "The ICW A constitutes a scheme enacted 
by Congress to ensure that Indian tribal members are protected, regardless of the lack 
of present tribal contacts." Id. 
294. Id. (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 
(1989)). 
295. The Bureau of Indian Affair's Voluntary Relocation Program illustrates the 
push for dispersion of Indians from their reservation homes to urban America. The 
program, implemented in 1931, attempted to integrate Indians into urban America by 
providing them with permanent off-reservation jobs. Participants received a one-way 
ticket to the city and financial assistance until they received their first pay check. The 
program received its biggest push following World War II. In fiscal year 1953, 2,600 
Indians were permanently placed in off-reservation jobs and thousands more were placed 
in temporary off-reservation positions. Two years later, placements had increased by 
sixty percent COHEN, supra note 175, at 234. 
296. See In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. App. 1992). In addressing the 
fallacy of state courts determining cultural ties the court stated: 
[Allowing state courts to determine what constitutes Indian culture] would be 
especially ironic, in that one of the reasons that the parents may not be 
involved in their Indian culture could be the very policies ofremoval oflndian 
children that ICW A was intended to counteract • . . • If state courts impose 
their own value system on these decisions, the tribes will never be able to 
regain members who have been lost because of earlier government policies. 
Id. at 209 n.2. 
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membership.297 The House report accompanying the ICWA reports 
that applying the ICWA to these children was required for their 
protection.298 An Indian child's cultural heritage is not a detriment, 
but a benefit which must be protected. 
In conclusion, the Bridget R. court argues that where the Indian child's 
parents lack significant social, cultural, or political ties to the Indian 
community, the ICWNs purpose of protecting tribal culture and assuring 
the existence of Indian tribes can never be met. However, by denying 
application of the ICWA, the Indian child will have no chance of 
exposure to his tribal heritage. That some tribal members may have lost 
their cultural ties is a sad fact of the success of past assimilationist 
policies. Limiting the tribes' ability to reach children of these tribal 
members assures that the children will never have the benefit of their 
cultural heritage and seals the success of assimilationist policies. 
b. Tenth Amendment 
The second constitutional argument the Bridget R. court makes is that 
the ICWA violates the Constitution's Tenth Amendment by infringing 
on rights ordinarily reserved to the states when it is applied to families 
with weak cultural ties.299 The court argues that because matters 
involving family relationships are generally reserved to the states, the 
ICWA should only apply if, in application, it passes at least one of two 
constitutional tests. The first test is that the ICWNs application must 
serve the specific purpose for which it was enacted, namely, "to promote 
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."300 The second 
test is that application must serve the general purpose of protecting tribal 
self-govemment.301 The Bridget R. court concludes that the ICWA's 
application to families with weak cultural ties fails both tests and 
297. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7539. The report specifically provides: ''This minor, perhaps infant, Indian does not 
have the capacity to initiate the formal, mechanical procedure necessary to become 
enrolled in his tribe to !alee advantage of the very valuable cultural and property benefits 
flowing therefrom." Id. 
298. Id. The report specifically provides: "Obviously, Congress has power to act 
for [the Indian children's] protection." Id. · 
299. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1510, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 528 
(1996), cert denied, Cindy R. v. James R., 117 S. Ct 693 (1997). 
300. Id. at 1511, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902). 
301. Id. 
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therefore violates the Tenth Amendment. However, the court's 
conclusion and arguments fail for two reasons. First, the court has 
applied the wrong test to determine whether the ICWA:s application 
violates the Tenth Amendment. Second, the ICWNs application to 
families with weak cultural ties meets the court's test, as it serves both 
the specific purpose for which the ICWA was enacted and the general 
purpose of protecting tribal self-government. 
The House Report accompanying the ICWA supports Tenth Amend-
ment constitutionality when the ICWA is applied to urban Indians with 
weak cultural ties. Interestingly, during the drafting of the ICWA, the 
Department of Justice expressed concern regarding the constitutionality 
of certain ICWA provisions.302 Congress rejected this concern by 
relying on its plenary power over Indians. First, Congress recognized 
its plenary power to legislate regarding Indians. This power is not 
limited to tribes but extends to the individual members of the tribe.303 
Second, Congress noted that this power is not limited by the geographic-
al boundaries of a tribes' reservation. The plenary power over Indians 
extends to activities occurring on or off the reservation.304 Additional-
ly, Congress noted that it has wide discretion in matters involving 
Indians and that courts should honor this discretion unless Congress' 
actions are purely arbitrary.305 Finally, Congress noted that its "'power 
. . . to regulate or prohibit traffic with tribal Indians within a State 
whether upon or off an Indian reservation is well settled . . .. "'306 
Thus, the appropriate test to determine constitutionality under the Tenth 
Amendment is whether Congress' exercise of power over families who 
may have weak cultural ties is arbitrary. When considered in light of 
302. H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7534. 
303. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7536. The report provides that 
"commerce with Indians [sic] tribes means commerce with the individuals composing 
those tribes." Id. (quoting U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417 (1866)). 
304. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7537. The report provides: 
If commerce, or traffic, or intercourse is carried on with an Indian tribe, or 
with a member of such tribe, it is subject to be regulated by Congress; 
although within the limits of a State. The locality of the traffic can have 
nothing to do with the power. The right to exercise it in reference to any 
Indian tribe, or any person who is a member of such tribe, is absolute, without 
reference to the locality of the traffic, or the locality of the tribe, or the 
member of the tribe with whom it is carried on. 
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418 (1866)). 
305. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7538. The report provides that "'it 
must also be conceded that, in determining what is reasonably essential to the protection 
of the Indians Congress is invested with a wide discretion and its action, unless purely 
arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the courts."' Id. (quoting Perrin v. 
U.S., 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914)). 
306. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 (1961) (emphasis added)), 
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the ICWA's history, such exercise of power is not arbitrary. In fact, 
applying the ICWA to families who may have weak cultural ties even 
meets the heightened Bridget R. test of serving the specific congressional 
purpose of protecting tribal integrity or the general congressional purpose 
of protecting tribal self-government. 
The ICWNs history shows that when Congress enacted the ICWA, 
tribal leaders feared that tribal culture and the very existence of the 
tribes was in jeopardy.307 Past assimilation policies had removed tribal 
members from the reservations and had dispersed them throughout the 
United States, generally in urban areas.308 The high rate of adoption 
and foster care placement of Indian children had the same effect.309 
An unwanted geographical boundary had been forced between the tribe 
and its members. By enacting the ICWA, Congress was attempting, 
among other things, to reverse the effect of past assimilation policies. 
To be effective, the ICWA would have to protect tribal rights regarding 
child custody matters arising off the reservation. To this end, congres-
sional exercise of power is not arbitrary. Additionally, it furthers the 
ICWA's specific purpose of promoting the integrity of Indian tribes, and 
it protects the Indian tribes' right to self-government of its tribal 
members. 
Illustrative of the ICWA's constitutionality is a South Dakota Supreme 
Court case which upholds the ICWA in the face of a Tenth Amendment 
attack. In In re Guardianship of D.L.L. & C.L.L.310 the South Dakota 
court held that the ICWA did not violate the Tenth Amendment.311 
The court reasoned that Congress had plenary power over Indians as 
granted by the Indian Commerce Clause.312 Congress therefore could 
307. Hearings on S. 1214 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and Public 
Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) 
(statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians); 
see supra note I. 
308. See supra note 295. 
309. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text 
310. 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980). 
3 I I. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
312. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. Section 8 provides in pertinent part: "The 
Congress shall have power [t]o ... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. 
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legislate regarding Indians as long as the legislation was not arbi-
trary.313 Additionally, the court held that the tribal member's physical 
location did not change the Tenth Amendment analysis. The analysis 
instead hinged on whether there was a need for tribal self-government 
over the matter.314 The court concluded that this need was met 
because the greatest threat to tribal self-governance was interference in 
custody matters of tribal members.315 Denying the ICWA's application 
to tribal members who may have weak cultural ties is no less a threat to 
tribal self-governance over custody matters involving tribal members. 
As such, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The existing Indian family exception is a judicially created exception 
to the ICWA. The ICWA applies to child custody matters regarding 
Indian children. An Indian child is a member or a potential member of 
an Indian tribe. The only exceptions to child custody matters are 
divorce proceedings and juvenile delinquency matters. Under the 
exception, courts have created a third requirement for invoking the 
ICWA. Namely, the child custody matter must involve the removal of 
the child from an existing Indian family. Additionally, this Indian parent 
must have significant ties to tribal culture or the reservation. 
The basic premise of the existing Indian family exception is flawed. 
The rationale for the exception is that Congress did not intend the ICWA 
apply in Indian child custody matters unless the matter involved the 
removal of an Indian child from an existing Indian family. The rationale 
skews Congress' intent by focusing on isolated portions of the legislative 
history, congressional findings, congressional policy, and the ICWA 
procedural provisions. However, when viewed as a whole, these sources 
show that Congress' intent in enacting the ICWA was to protect the 
313. In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d at 281. The court specifically 
stated: 
Id. 
The Tenth Amendment, which reserves all nondelegated powers to the states 
or the people, has not been violated by the [!CW A]. The plenary power of 
Congress to legislate with respect to Indians is a deep-seated one. Such 
legislation does not infringe upon the Tenth Amendment as long as the 
legislative power is not exercised arbitrarily. 
3 I 4. Id. at 28 I. The court specifically stated: "The locus of the act of a member 
is not conclusive. Rather, the test is a broader one, hinging on whether the matter 
demands exercise of the tribe's responsibility of self-government." Id. 
315. Id. The court specifically stated: "There can be no greater threat to essential 
tribal relations and to the tribal power of self-government than to interfere in questions 
of custody of tribal members." Id. 
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child, the extended family, and the tribe. Limiting the ICWA:s 
application under the exception subverts Congress' intent to protect the 
child, the extended family, and the tribe. 
The existing Indian family exception is also contrary to the United 
States Supreme Court's analysis of the ICWA in HolY.field. Tribal 
interests, instead of being placed on an even footing with parental rights, 
are ignored under the exception. Individual actions effectively defeat the 
tribe's right, not only to jurisdiction, but even to participation in the 
child custody matter. The exception places a pivotal issue in the hands 
of the state courts. These courts are the least qualified of all participants 
to determine the tribe's place in the Indian child's life. The state courts 
must follow the plain language of the ICWA and apply the ICWA to all 
child custody matters involving Indian children as defined by the ICWA. 
Until state courts abandon the use of the exception, it will be a 
continuing threat to tribal interests and the survival of Indian culture. 
WENDY THERESE PARNELL 
437 
